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Sporhase v. Nebraska ex reL Douglas:
A Call for New Approaches to Water
Resource Management
By Carl P.A. Nelson*
Introduction
Among the recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Com-
merce Clause is Sporhase v. Nebraska ex ret Douglas.' This decision
examines the constitutionality of a Nebraska statute restricting the ex-
port of ground water.2 The crucial provision of the statute prohibited
the transfer of ground water from Nebraska into an adjoining state if
that state prohibited a transfer of its water into Nebraska. This reci-
procity provision was held to unreasonably burden interstate com-
merce. In order to reach the Commerce Clause issue, the Court first
had to determine whether water is an item of interstate commerce.
For many years it was settled law that water was not an item of
commerce In 1966, however, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed
a three-judge district court decision holding water an item of com-
* A.B., 1977, University of California, Berkeley; member of the third year class. The
author would like to thank Antonio Rossman for his constructive suggestions, and his wife,
Suzanne A. Nelson, for her invaluable support.
1. 458 U.S. 941 (1982). The Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 provides:
"Congress shall have power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
2. NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978). See infra note 27 for the relevant text of the
statute. For a discussion of the Supreme Court analysis, see infra text accompanying notes
114-42.
Ground water is subsurface water existing in interstices of soil and rocks. NAT'L
WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 230 (1973) (Final Report to the Presi-
dent and the Congress) [hereinafter cited as WATER POLICIES]. It is part of the hydrological
cycle and is interconnected with surface water. R. FREEZE & J. CHERRY, GROUNDWATER 3-
5 (1979). It is sometimes found in aquifers (Ie., saturated underground bodies of rock or
similar material capable of storing water and transmitting it to wells or springs). WATER
POLICIES, supra, at xxiii.
3. See, e.g., Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 (1908) (by
implication). See also Martz & Grazis, Interstate Transfers of Water and Water Rights-The
Slurry Issue, 23 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 33, 61 (1977); Comment, "It's Our Waterl'!--
Can Wyoming Constituionaly Prohibit the Exportation of State Waters?, 10 LAND & WATER
L. REv. 119, 128 (1975).
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merce.4 This decision by no means resolved the issue,5 for the Supreme
Court did not even mention the leading case standing for the tradi-
tional view that water was not an item of commerce.6 In Sporhase, the
Court finally resolved this inconsistency by specifically finding that
water is an item of commerce, thus subjecting water to the constrictions
of the Commerce Clause.
7
This decision is likely to have considerable impact upon water re-
source allocation, in part because many Western States have enacted
statutes controlling the export of water in an effort to protect their finite
water supplies.' Water allocation is a matter of considerable impor-
tance, for water is essential not only to life but to economic growth as
4. Carr v. City of Altus, 385 U.S. 35 (1966) (per curiam), aft'g255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D.
Tex. 1966).
5. Compare City of Altus, 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex.), afl'dmem. 385 U.S. 35 (1966)
with Hudson County, 209 U.S. 349 (1908). A related issue also left undecided was the cir-
cumstances in which a state statute prohibiting the transfer of water out of that state could
survive a constitutional challenge under the Commerce Clause. Various commentators have
attempted to resolve these issues in such a way as to be consistent with both holdings.
Corker, Can a State Embargo the Export of Water by Transbasin Diversion?, 12 IDAHO L.
REv. 135 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Transbasin Diversion]; Corker, Suits in the Supreme
Court's Original Jurisdiction, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 132, at 321 (R. Clark ed.
1967); See Corker, Water Rights in Interstate Streams, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
§ 131.6, at 319 (R. Clark ed. 1967); Ladd, Federal andInterstate Conflicts in Montana Water
Law: Supportfor a State Water Plan 42 MONT. L. REv. 267 (1981); Martz & Grazis, supra
note 3; McDaniel, Commerce Clause and Water Availability Issues Concerning Coal Slurry
Pi#elines, 12 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 533 (1979); White, Reasonable State Regulation ofthe
Interstate Transfer ofPercolating Water, 2 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 383 (1969); Note, Inter-
state Transfer of Water: The Western Challenge to the Commerce Clause, 59 TEx. L. REv.
1249 (1981); Comment, Do State Water And-Exportation Statutes Violate the Commerce
Clause? or Will New Mexico's Embargo Law Hold Water?, 21 NAT. RESOURCES J. 617
(1981); [hereinafter cited as Comment, Water Anti-Exportation Statutes]; Comment, Water
Rights and the Commerce Clause: City of Altus v. Carr, 47 OR. L. REv. 228 (1968); Com-
ment, City of Altus v. Carr, 9 ARIz. L. REv. 334 (1967).
6. In City of Altus, there is no mention of the Hudson County decision. The full text of
the per curiam opinion is: "The motion to affirm is granted and the judgment is affirmed."
385 U.S. 35 (1966). The district court opinion simply dismissed the Hudson County decision.
255 F. Supp. at 839. See infra note 39.
7. 458 U.S. at 953-54.
8. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-153B (Supp. 1981); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-90-136
(1973), § 37-81-101 (Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE § 42-408 (1977); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82(a)-
726 (1977); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-1-121 (1983); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 46-233.01, -613.01
(1978); NEv. REV. STAT. § 533.520 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-19 (1978); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 82, § 1085.22 (West Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.810 (1979-80); S.D. COMp.
LAWS ANN. § 46-1-13 (Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-2-8 (Supp. 1979); WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. §§ 90.03.300, 90.16.110, 90.16.120 (1962); Wyo. STAT. § 41-3-105 (1977); see
also COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-136 (1973) (repealed 1983). A similar Texas statute was
struck down by the district court in City ofAltus, 255 F. Supp. at 840, and subsequently was
repealed. Act of Aug. 30, 1965, ch. 568, 1965 TEx. GEN. LAWS 1245, repealed byAct of Apr.
12, 1971, ch. 58, 1971 TEx. GEN. LAWS 658.
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well? Water is also in short supply. National water needs already ap-
proach total water resources,' 0 and in some regions, local needs exceed
local resources."1 By the year 2000, water demand will exceed avail-
able supply if present trends continue.I2
The allocation of water is of primary concern in the West. The
seventeen Western states comprise sixty percent of the land area of the
continental United States, yet they enjoy only twenty-five percent of
the water resources.13
The traditional name for those lands lying west of the one hun-
dredth meridian is the "Great American Desert." 4 The name is by no
means inaccurate: the one hundredth meridian is near the western
boundary of the region that receives more than twenty inches of aver-
age annual rainfall. 5 Land receiving less than this amount of rainfall
is virtually impossible to farm without irrigation.' 6 Not surprisingly,
9. WATER POLICIES, supra note 2, at ix, 39.
10. R. FREEZE & J. CHERRY, supra note 2, at 1.
11. WATER POLICIES, supra note 2, at 1.
12. See Water Resources Development Act: Hearings on S. 703 & S. 1241 Before the
Subcomr. on Water Resources of the Senate Comm on Env't and Pub. Works, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 452 (1979) (Statement of Sen. Domenici); D. HALACY, JR., THE WATER CRISIS 11
(1966); Sheets, Water: Will We Have Enough to Go Around?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
June 29, 1981, at 34. But see NAT'L WATER COMM'N, A SUMMARY DIGEST OF STATE
WATER LAWS 1-2 (1973) [hereinafter cited as STATE WATER LAWS]: "[T]he water supply
available to the American people probably is sufficient to meet foreseeable future demands,
although there will be water shortages in localized areas, particularly in arid regions." One
localized area, the Ogallala aquifer, may be depleted within 30 or 40 years. Canby, Water:
Our Most Precious Resource, 158 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 144, 158 (1980). See Sheets, supra, at
35. See also WATER POLICIES, supra note 2, at 11- 16 (discussion of alternative futures), and
at 17 ("any projection of the future need for water based only on past trends is quite likely to
be wrong").
13. L. MILNE & M. MILNE, WATER AND LIFE 47 (1972); Canby, supra note 12, at 148.
The seventeen Western States are Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas,
Utah, Washington and Wyoming.
14. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 952-53, n.13 (quoting California v. United States, 438 U.S.
645, 648 (1978)). A statement by Daniel Webster about the "Great American Desert" bears
mentioning: "What do we want with this vast worthless area - this region of savages and
wild beasts, of deserts of shifting sands and whirl winds of dust, of cactus and prairie dogs?
To what use could we ever hope to put these great deserts and those endless mountain
ranges, impenetrable and covered to their base with eternal snow?" Sax, Federal Reclama-
tion Law, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 110, at 113 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
15. Compare U.S. DEP'T. OF INTERIOR, GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, THE NAT'L ATLAS 97
(1970) [hereinafter cited as THE NAT'L ATLAS] with id at 2. There are some lands west of
the one hundredth meridian that do receive more than 20 inches of rainfall annually: the
northern Pacific Coast region and the montane regions scattered throughout the West. See
id at 97.
16. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 952-53 n.13 (quoting California v. United States, 438 U.S. at
648); C. HUNT & R. GARRELS, WATER: THE WEB OF LIFE 69-70 (1972); SOIL CONSERVA-
TION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T. OF AGIuc., America'r Soil & Water: Condition & Trends 25
(1980).
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more than eighty percent of the total irrigation in the nation takes place
in these same Western states.'7  This irrigation has transformed the
"Great American Desert" into some of the most productive land in the
country: in 1978, Western farms produced crops valued at thirty-seven
percent of the national total18 and produced forty-two percent of the
nation's total farm products. 9 The value of these farmlands them-
selves exceeded sixty percent of the total value of American farmland.20
An adequate water supply is essential to these Western resources. The
importance of water is not restricted to agriculture; water is also essen-
tial to economic vitality and quality of life.21
Under Sporhase, the statutes that many Western states enacted to
protect this precious resource may no longer be valid.22 State statutes
restricting the interstate transfer of water are now clearly subject to
"dormant Commerce Clause analysis."23 In addition, the Sporhase de-
cision may hinder the enforcement of interstate compacts and equitable
apportionments concerning interstate waters.
24
17. R. FREEZE & J. CHERRY, supra note 2, at 6; SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE, supra
note 16, at 25. Agriculture accounts for 90% of water use in the West. Sheets, supra note 12,
at 37.
18. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 667 (1981).
19. Id. at 665. Twenty percent of the key agricultural products are grown on land over-
lying the Ogallala aquifer. Sheets, supra note 12, at 35. This region produces 25% of
America's agricultural exports. Id.
20. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 18, at 664.
21. Stamm, After Teton, RECLAMATION ERA, Autumn 1976, at 26.
22. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 954-48. Commentators anticipated that many of the stat-
utes listed, see supra note 8, would not survive Commerce Clause scrutiny. See, eg.., Martz
& Grazis, supra note 3; Note, supra note 5; Comment, supra note 3. But see Comment,
Water Anti-Exportation Statutes, supra note 5. For a brief analysis of some types of these
statutes, see infra notes 166-99 and accompanying text. For a more thorough analysis of
certain of these statutes, see Note, supra note 5 (a general analysis); Ladd, supra note 5
(Montana statutes); Martz & Grazis, supra note 3 (Colorado statute); McDaniel, supra note
5, (Wyoming statutes); Comment, supra note 3 (Wyoming statute); Comment, Water Anti-
Exportation Statutes, supra note 5 (New Mexico statute).
23. This expression refers to restrictions which the judiciary has held to be placed on
state regulation by the Commerce Clause even though Congress has not exercised its regula-
tory authority. Alternate expressions of the same doctrine are "silent Commerce Clause"
and "the negative implications of the Commerce Clause." See infra notes 84-89 and accom-
panying text for a treatment of criticism of this doctrine.
24. Underlying these mechanisms for allocating water is an implicit need to restrict
water export. See infranotes 219-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of these mecha-
nisms.
The Sporhase decision may have laid to rest dicta in previous cases that Congress was
not empowered to impose a particular type of water law upon a state. See California Ore-
gon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 164 (1935) ("Congress cannot
enforce either [the 'common law riparian rights' or the 'appropriation'] rule upon any state")
(citing Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 94 (1907)).
This note will first examine the Sporhase opinion. Part I will dis-
cuss the factual setting in which the litigation arose. Part II will ana-
lyze the Court's reasoning in support of its finding that water is an item
of interstate commerce in a state where it arguably is not an item of
intrastate commerce. Part III will (1) question the wisdom of applying
Commerce Clause analysis in the absence of federal regulation in the
area, (2) investigate the applicability of certain exemptions from Com-
merce Clause analysis that have been recognized by the Court in other
settings, and (3) examine the application of dormant Commerce Clause
analysis to the Sporhase facts. Part IV will examine the claim that
Congress has explicitly authorized state regulation of water. Part V
will review the various implications of the Sporhase decision and evalu-
ate possible solutions to the water crisis that remain available at the
state and federal levels.
I. The Factual Setting
Appellants Sporhase and Moss jointly farmed contiguous tracts of
land in Chase County, Nebraska, and Phillips County, Colorado.
Their application for a permit to withdraw ground water from their
Colorado tract of land was denied.2 5 Thereafter, they spent over forty-
three thousand dollars to develop irrigation systems to apply water
drawn from a well on the Nebraska tract to crops on both sides of the
state line.26 The appellants neglected to obtain a permit to transport
the water withdrawn in Nebraska for use in Colorado as required by
Nebraska statutory law.27
25. See In re 4pplication of Sporhase and Moss for a Permit to Construct a Well to Use
Water from the Ogallala Formation of the Northern High Plains Designated Ground Water
Basin in Phillps County, Colo., File No. AD-6826 (Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, July 8,
1977) (on file, with cover letter, with the Hastings ConstitutionalLaw Quarterly). The permit
was refused because the aquifer was already being depleted. Id; see also cover letter from
Colorado Division of Water Resources to Sporhase & Moss (July 8, 1977), at 1. The denial
was consonant with Colorado policy to avoid "depletion wars" with neighboring states. See
Thompson v. Colorado Ground Water Comm'n, 194 Colo. 489, 495, 575 P.2d 372, 377
(1978) (en bane).
26. Brief for the Appellants at 3-4, Sporhase, 458 U.S. 941 (1982). The well tapped into
the vast Ogallala aquifer which underlies Appellants' tracts in both Colorado and Nebraska
and extends under parts of Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. Sporhase, 438 U.S.
at 953. See THE NAT'L ATLAS, supra note 15, at 122-23; Canby, supra note 12, at 150-55.
Ground water use exceeds recharge in many portions of the Ogallala aquifer. See WATER
POLICIES, supra note 2, at 23; SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE, supra note 16, at 27. This is
known as ground water overdraft or ground water mining. See R. FREEZE & J. CHERRY,
supra note 2, at 364. This can produce several undesirable results: less efficient pumping,
which may contravene water rights; intrusions of salt water or polluted water, land subsi-
dence; depletion of surrounding stream flows; and, ultimately, depletion of all water that can
be feasibly extracted. Id
27. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978). The statute provides: "Any person, firm, city,
village, municipal corporation or any other entity intending to withdraw ground water from
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The State of Nebraska brought an action to enjoin the use of the
water in Colorado without the requisite permit. A Nebraska district
court granted the injunction and the Nebraska Supreme Court af-
firmed, disposing of Appellants' Commerce Clause defense by declar-
ing that Nebraska ground water is not an article of intrastate commerce
and thus could not be an article of interstate commerce.28
II. Water as an Article of Interstate Commerce
A. The Two Leading Cases: Hudson County and City of Altus
The Supreme Court began its discussion of whether water is an
item of commerce with a study of the two important Supreme Court
decisions examining the validity of state embargoes of water. These
decisions came to opposite conclusions about the validity of state stat-
utes prohibiting the export of water and the propriety of characterizing
water as an article of commerce. The Court concluded that neither
decision was directly on point.
The State of Nebraksa argued in Sporhase that Hudson County
Water Co. v. McCarter29 was controlling. In Hudson County, a water
company possessing a contractual right to withdraw water in New
Jersey sought to transport the water to New York in violation of a New
Jersey statute that prohibited its export.30 The Court rejected each of
the water company's constitutional arguments that the statute should
be declared invalid. The main thrust of the Court's opinion in Hudson
Valley dealt with the just compensation issue.3 The majority dismissed
the water company's Commerce Clause argument with the simple
any well or pit located in the State of Nebraska and transport it for use in an adjoining state
shall apply to the Department of Water Resources for a permit to do so. If the Director of
Water Resources finds that the withdrawal of the ground water requested is reasonable, is
not contrary to the conservation and use of ground water, and is not otherwise detrimental
to the public welfare, he shall grant the permit !f the state in which the water is to be used
grants reciprocal rights to withdraw and transport ground waterfrom that state for use in the
State of Nebraska." (emphasis added).
28. State ex relDouglas v. Sporhase, 208 Neb. 703, 710, 305 N.W.2d 614, 619 (1981).
29. 209 U.S. 349 (1908). Of note is the fact that the Court in Hudson County specifically
excluded from consideration "the problems of irrigation." Id. at 356.
30. Act of Mar. 1, 1905, ch. 238, § 1, 1905 N.J. LAWS 461, amended by Act of May 17,
1965, ch. 70, § 1, 1965 N.J. LAws 193-94 (to allow export of water with written consent of
Department of Conservation and Economic Development), repealed byAct of Aug. 13, 1981,
ch. 262, § 26, 1981 N.J. LAWS. New Jersey now allows water export pursuant to a permit
system administered by the Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Protection.
N.J. REv. STAT. § 58:1A-3-17 (1982). At the time of Hudson County, New Jersey followed
the riparian doctrine of water rights and did not allow stream water to be used on land not
adjacent to the source of the water. Hudson County, 209 U.S. at 354. New York also was,
and is, a riparian jurisdiction. See STATE WATER LAWS, supra note 14, at 527; White, supra
note 5, at 389-90.
31. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 946.
statement that a person could not acquire or enlarge a property right by
his "desire to use it in commerce among the States."' 32 As support for
this conclusion, the Court cited Geer v. Connecticut.33 The Supreme
Court, however, recently overruled Geer,34 thus undermining the logi-
cal foundation for the holding in Hudson County that a state embargo
of "state owned" water does not violate the Commerce Clause.
In City ofAltus v. Car,35 the case relied upon by the appellants in
Sporhase, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed a three-judge district
court holding that the Commerce Clause prevented the State of Texas
from constitutionally prohibiting the export of ground water.36 City of
Altus involved a Texas statute forbidding the withdrawal of ground
water for export.3 7 The statute was challenged by Altus, a city in
Oklahoma which had contracted to withdraw ground water from land
situated in Texas for use in the municipality. Tn support of the statute,
the State of Texas argued that Hudson County was controlling and that
the statute furthered the legitimate purpose of conservation. The dis-
trict court rejected the conservation argument on the grounds that in-
trastate commerce in Texas water was unrestricted 38 and simply
dismissed the Hudson County decision.39 The court relied instead on
more recent cases involving state regulation of natural gas.4°
The Court in Sporhase began by distinguishing City of Altus on
two grounds. First, the Court stated that City of Altus was merely a
summary affirmation of the lower court decision; as such it indicates
agreement only with the result reached below, not necessarily with the
reasoning upon which the decision is based.41 Thus, City OfAltus has
32. Hudson County, 209 U.S. at 356-57. The Supreme Court did not require that New
Jersey show any present or future need for the water. Id The Court noted that the decision
was not based on a claim of "state ownership" of the water. Id. at 354-55.
33. 161 U.S. 519 (1896). See Hudson County, 209 U.S. at 357. For a discussion of Geer,
see infra text accompanying notes 47-60.
34. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979).
35. 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex.), afdper curiam, 385 U.S. 35 (1966).
36. Ciy of41tus, 255 F. Supp. at 840.
37. Act of Aug. 30, 1965, ch. 568, 1965 TEx. GEN. LAWS 1245 (repealed).
38. City Af,41tus, 255 F. Supp. at 840.
39. "In our opinion, none of the above cases including Hudson County presents suffi-
cient authority for this Court to disregard the holdings of the cases of Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania v. State of West Virginia, and West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., which are
found to be controlling on the issue presented herein." Id at 839.
40. Id Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 560-61 (1923) and West Kansas
Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 255-61 (1911) held that natural gas was an item of intrastate
commerce and as such could not be excluded from interstate commerce. For a discussion of
these cases, see infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
41. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 949. See supra note 6 for the text of the Court's opinion in
City Af 4tAus.
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only a limited value as precedent.42 Secondly, the applicable state
water law in Sporhase was different from that in City ofAltus.43 Unlike
Texas water law, which grants a landowner the right to withdraw an
unlimited amount of ground water for use or sale," Nebraska water
law allows withdrawal of ground water only for reasonable and benefi-
cial use on the overlying land45 with a statutory exemption enabling
municipalities to import water from elsewhere.4
B. Comparison of the Grounds Supporting Hudson County and City of
Altus
The decision in Hudson County was based on the "state owner-
ship" exemption from Commerce Clause analysis set forth in Geer v.
Connecticut.
47
Geer involved a statute prohibiting the export of any wild game
captured in Connecticut. The Court in Geer rejected a Commerce
Clause challenge to the statute, holding that the state could prevent the
export of game captured within the state's borders because it "owned"
42. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 949 (citing Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S.
490 (1981)). A summary disposition of an appeal is entitled to some precedential value. See
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332,344 (1975); C. WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 108, at
758, n.25 (4th ed. 1983). The precedential value, however, is less than a decision rendered
after plenary consideration. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 500; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
671 (1974).
It has been argued that because City of Aitus reached the Court on direct appeal, the
Court's affirmation does not indicate that it had decided to include water in the dormant
Commerce Clause review of state regulations. Comment, supra note 3, at 135. Although it
is literally true that the Court must address the merits on direct appeal pursuant to statute, L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3.5, at 35 n.8 (1978), in practice this is seriously
misleading. Id.; C. WRIGHT, supra § 108, at 755-56 (1983). See also Note, Supreme Court
Per Curiam Practice A Critique, 69 HARV. L. REv. 707 (1956). The Court processes appeals
and writs of certiorari in much the same way: each case must receive four votes in order to
reach a hearing on the merits. Ohio ex rel Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246 (1959) (per curiam)
(separate memorandum by Brennan, J.). Of course, it is a valid argument that the Supreme
Court would be unlikely to abandon a "long-held view" by way of summary disposition.
See Comment, supra note 3, at 135.
43. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 949.
44. City ofAltus, 225 F. Supp. at 840. This right derives from Texas common law. See
City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 292-94, 476 S.W.2d 798, 801-02
(1955), and is subject only to two limitations: (1) ground water may not be taken mali-
ciously for the sole purpose of injuring another, City of Corpus Christ4 154 Tex. at 292, 276
S.W.2d at 801, and (2) water may not be wantonly and wilfully wasted. Id; Pecos County
Water Control & Improvements Dist. No. 1 v. Williams, 271 S.W.2d 503, 505 (rex. Civ.
App. 1954).
45. State ex rel Douglas v. Sporhase, 208 Neb. 703, 705, 305 N.W.2d 614, 617 (1981)
(citing Olson v. City of Wahoo, 124 Neb. 802, 248 N.W. 304 (1933)). This right is subject to
an additional restriction in times of shortage: each landowner may withdraw only a reason-
able portion of the whole. Id.
46. NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-638 (1943).
47. Hudson County, 209 U.S. at 357 (citing Geer, 161 U.S. 519 (1896)).
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uncaptured game and the state did not completely relinquish its owner-
ship interest when the game was captured.48 The private ownership
interest in captured game was overcome by the "state ownership" in
uncaptured game.49
The theory of "state ownership" has long been questioned.5" In a
1948 case involving the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the theory
was considered insufficient justification for a state regulation that dis-
criminated against nonresident commercial fishermen.5 "State owner-
ship" was considered "a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the
importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and regu-
late the exploitation of an important resource."5 2
In Hughes v. Oklahoma,5" the Supreme Court re-examined the
48. Geer, 161 U.S. at 534-35. The Court stated, inter alia, that the state had a duty to
preserve for its people a valuable food supply. Id
49. Id
50. See, e.g., R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 197-200
(1922). In the Roman law, from which many tenets of the Anglo-American common law are
derived, it was recognized that certain things could not be subject to private ownership.
Among them were the res nullius ("property of no one") and the res communes ("property
common to all"--eg., light and air). As a result of medieval confusion between imperium
(power to regulate), daominium (actual ownership), and nineteenth century doctrine that
everything must be owned, it became common to express the sovereign power to regulate
natural resources not yet appropriated as ownership of these natural resources. Id at 199.
But see Lasky, From Prior Appropriat/on to Economic Distribution of Water by the State-Via
Irrigation Administration, 1 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. MIN. L. INsT. 161, 186-87 (1929) (state
ownership of water means more than interest in conservation and economical use). The
Supreme Court has adopted the view of R. POUND, supra. See infra note 5 1.
The distinction between imperium and dominium forms the analytic basis of an exemp-
tion from dormant Commerce Clause analysis. This exemption originated in Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) and was reaffirmed in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,
447 U.S. 429 (1980). Under the reasoning in those two cases, the dormant Commerce Clause
applies only to state regulation, not to state "market participation." State regulation corre-
sponds to imperium and "market participation" corresponds to dominium.
51. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948). The Court cited R. POUND, supra note 50,
with approval. Toomer, 334 U.S. at 402 n.37.
Commerce Clause cases are appropriate support for reasoning in Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause cases because of the common origin of the two clauses in the fourth article of
the Articles of Confederation, as well as their shared view of Federalism. See Hicklin v.
Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531-32 (1978). Applying the same logic, the converse should also be
true.
52. Toomer, 334 U.S. at 402. This eminently quotable dictum was elevated to Com-
merce Clause doctrine in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 334 (1979), and was cited with
approval in Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 951.
53. 441 U.S. 322 (1979). Hughes involved a statute prohibiting the export of natural
minnows captured in the State of Oklahoma. OKLA. STAT. tit. 29, § 4-115 (B) (Supp. 1978),
amended by 1981 Okla. Sess. Laws 431 ch. 195, 4-115, codfiedin OKLA. STAT. tit. 29, § 4-115
(B) (Supp. 1983). Hughes, a licensed Texan minnow dealer, was arrested for transporting
out of Oklahoma a load of natural minnows bought from a licensed Oklahoma minnow
dealer. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals relied upon Geer to reject Hughes' argu-
ment that the Oklahoma statute was constitutionally invalid. Hughes v. State, 572 P.2d 573,
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state ownership theory in the light of the Commerce Clause. The Court
in Hughes traced the erosion of the state ownership theory that had
been articulated by the Court in Geer. The Court noted that the "state
ownership" doctrine had been weakened in cases involving state regu-
lation of wild animals in contexts different from that in Geer.54 The
Court also examined West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co." and Penn-
sylvania v. West Virginia,5 6 two decisions in which the Supreme Court
had not followed the Geer rationale. Significantly, these were the two
decisions upon which the district court in City of Al/us rested its opin-
ion. 7 Both cases involved natural gas regulation. In each decision, the
Court had reasoned that if one state was allowed to embargo its natural
resources, others would follow suit; the result would be the sort of eco-
nomic isolationism that the Commerce Clause was drafted to prevent.5 8
Resources travelling in intrastate commerce could not possibly be
575 (1977). The Oklahoma Court distinguished Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278
U.S. 1 (1928), which struck down a statute that proscribed the export of shrimp caught off
the Louisiana Coast unless they were partially processed in the state. This distinction is
somewhat curious, for the Oklahoma statute at issue in Hughes placed an unconditional ban
on export of minnows, and thus was more restrictive than the statute struck down in Foster-
Fountain.
The Oklahoma statute before the Court in Hughes permitted unrestricted intrastate
transportation of natural minnows and the unrestricted export of hatchery-grown minnows
and noncommercial quantities of natural minnows. OKLA. STAT. tit. 29, § 4-115 (B) (Supp.
1978). After the embargo provision was struck down, the statute was amended to provide
for a licensing procedure in those instances in which export had previously been prohibited.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 29, § 4-115 (B) (Supp. 1983).
54. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 331-35. See Foster-Fountain Packing Co., 278 U.S. 1 (1928)
Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977) (adopting view of Geer dissenters
that it is "pure fantasy" to talk of owning wild animals); Missouri v. Holland 252 U.S. 416
(1920) (Missouri did not own birds migrating through the State; state regulation pre-empted
by congressional statute implementing treaty with Great Britain); see also Toomer, 334 U.S.
385 (1948); supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
55. 221 U.S. 229 (1911). The case involved a challenge to a statute that prohibited the
exportation of natural gas through use of pipelines or the highways. 1907 OKLA. SESs. LAWS
ch. 67, § 2. Oklahoma sought to justify the statute by proffering a legitimate state interest in
conservation as the purpose of the statute. The Court rejected the argument because intra-
state transportation of natural gas was wholly unrestricted. Kansas Natural Gas, 221 U.S. at
255.
56. 262 U.S. 553 (1923). The challenged West Virginia statute gave its citizens priority
of access to the natural gas produced in the state during times of shortage. 1919 W. VA.
AcTs ch. 919. Relying on Kansas Natural Gas, the Court declared the statute an unreasona-
ble burden on interstate commerce. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. at 596-600.
57. City of Altus, 255 F. Supp. at 839.
58. Kansas Natural Gas, 221 U.S. at 255. "If the states have such power a singular
situation might result. Pennsylvania might keep its coal, the Northwest its timber, the min-
ing states their minerals. . . . [I]n matters of foreign and interstate commerce there are no
state lines . . . each State is made the greater by a division of its resources, natural and
created, with every other State and those of every other State with it." Id (quoted with
approval in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. at 596-600).
embargoed: 9
The Court in Hughes declined to follow the "state ownership" the-
ory even though the facts were "on all fours" with those in Geer. In-
stead, the Court overruled Geer and adopted the position that a claim
of state ownership of natural resources is insufficient to justify prevent-
ing such resources from entering interstate commerce.
60
The state ownership theory relied on in Hudson County and Geer is
outdated. The modem view is stated by the Supreme Court in Hughes,
using the same analysis upon which City of Altus is grounded. In
Sporhase, therefore, the Court properly did not follow the holding in
Hudson County.
C. Other Arguments Against the Inclusion of Water as an Item of
Commerce
I. Nebraska Groundwater is So Regulated It is Not an Item of
Commerce
In Sporhase, the Court also examined the contention that ground
water use is so regulated in Nebraska that it never entered commerce.
In City of Altus, Hughes, and the cases upon which Hughes is based, an
absolute ownership interest could exist in the natural resource subject
to the state regulation. Nebraska law, however, recognizes only an usu-
fructuary right in water.61 The use of Nebraska ground water must be
59. Kansas Natural Gas, 221 U.S. at 255; Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. at 599-
600.
60. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 335. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, dis-
sented. Rehnquist contended that the holding in Geer was based not only upon the "state
ownership" theory but also upon the state's police powers, and thus should have been sus-
tained. 441 U.S. at 340 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The quotation from Geer that was
proffered in support of this contention was countered effectively in the majority opinion by a
quotation from the same passage which indicated that the Court in Geer felt that the police
powers were directly derived from state ownership. Compare id at 340 n.3 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) with id. at 327 n.6. Furthermore, even if the dissent's contention was accepted,
the result should not differ, for a state's exercise of its police powers must be consistent with
the dormant Commerce Clause. Douglas, 431 U.S. at 284-85; Kansas Natural Gas, 221 U.S.
at 255; Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. at 598. See Note, supra note 5, at 1270-77.
Most commentators who have expressed an opinion on the subject support the major-
ity's position in Hughes that the term "state ownership" as applied to natural resources is a
misnomer, and that the actual meaning of the term is that the State has an interest in regu-
lating that resource to assure conservation. See R. POUND, supra note 50; Trelease, Govern-
ment Ownership and Trusteeshp of Water, 45 CALIF. L. REV. 638 (1957); Comment, Water
A4nti-Exportation Statutes, supra note 5, at 626; Comment, supra note 3, at 141; Note, supra
note 5, at 1266. Cf. Ladd, supra note 5, at 310 (Tenth Amendment does not reserve powers
sufficiently expansive to justify a state's claim of exclusive rights to its natural resources).
Rut see Lasky, supra note 50 ("state ownership" of water consists of more than state interest
in conservation).
61. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 948 n.10. A usufructuary right to water is the right to use
water. Blackstone long ago recognized that the nature of water made it unsuitable for abso-
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reasonable and beneficial and may occur only on the overlying land.62
Ground water may not be sold, rented, traded or transferred.6 3 As Jus-
tice Rehnquist asserted, it is difficult to see how commerce can exist in
a resource so regulated. 64
This would be a compelling argument but for the fact that water
may be transferred off the overlying land for sale to municipalities.65
The Nebraska Supreme Court did not consider such a transfer to be a
sale of an item of commerce in a market setting because the municipal-
ities were charged for the water based on the cost of delivery only, and
not on the intrinsic value of the water itself.66 Although there is sup-
port for the proposition that water can be distinguished from other re-
sources because water resource allocation is made largely outside a
market price system,67 the majority of the United States Supreme
Court concluded that this difference was insufficient to remove the case
from the analysis set forth in Hughes .
68
The price of an item of commerce in a buyer's market presumably
would be closely related to the cost of production and delivery. Even
where a seller obtains a price in excess of his costs, if price regulation
were imposed, the economic effect would be indistinguishable from the
rate structure Nebraska required in all ground water transfers to mu-
nicipalities.6 9 It was not contended in Sporhase that price regulation
should be beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause. Further, if the
analysis of the Nebraska Supreme Court was accepted, federal power
over a ground water transaction would wax and wane depending upon
lute ownership apart from its use: "water is a moveable, wandering thing, and must of
necessity continue in common by the law of nature; so that I can only have a temporary,
transient, usufructuary property therein .... " 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 18
(1753).
62. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 949-51. Even that right is further limited: in times of
shortage, landowners may withdraw water only in amounts reasonably proportionate to
their share of the land overlying the ground water source. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 950 (citing
State ex relDouglas v. Sporhase, 208 Neb. at 705, 305 N.W.2d at 617); STATE WATER LAWS,
supra note 12, at 469. This is known as the doctrine of correlative rights. Id at 53.
63. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 963 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See State ex rel Douglas v.
Sporhase, 208 Neb. at 708, 305 N.W.2d at 618. But see Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 963 (water may
be sold to municipalities).
64. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 963 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 951. See Metropolitan Utils. Dist. v. Merritt Beach Co., 179 Neb. 783, 140
N.W.2d 626 (1966); NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-638 (1943). Justice Rehnquist briefly acknowl-
edged this. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 963-65 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Furthermore, even in
the district in which the appellants' well was located, water could be transferred to other
lands controlled by the same person. Id. at 954-55. See infra note 128.
66. State ex rel Douglas v. Sporhase, 208 Neb. at 707-08, 305 N.W.2d at 618.
67. See WATER POLICIES, supra note 2, at 319. Legal and administrative institutions
play a primary role in water resource allocation. Id. at 249, 319. This is especially true of
subsidized water provided by major Western water development projects. Id. at 256-57.
68. Sporhase, 458 U.S. 951-52.
69. Id. at 952.
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whether the transaction was characterized as a sale of goods or merely
a reimbursement for the cost of delivery.70 A principled Commerce
Clause analysis must reject such a formalistic distinction.
2 Water Should be Locally Managed Because It is Essential to Human
Survival
The Nebraska Supreme Court also based its decision upon the al-
ternative ground that water is best suited to state and local manage-
ment because it is necessary for human survival.7' It cannot be denied
that water is essential to human life; however, the primary use of water
in the Western States is not directly to preserve human life: over eighty
percent of water consumed is used to produce agricultural products
that travel in commerce both "among the several States" and "with
foreign Nations."7" The Court in Sporhase noted that this is precisely
the sort of commerce that the Framers intended to be regulated by the
federal government. The Court observed further that the water
pumped from the appellants' well originated in the Ogallala aquifer,
which underlies several states.73 Thus, there is a significant federal in-
terest in the conservation and fair allocation of water from this
70. Id. Although the Court was not faced with a situation in which there was no intra-
state commerce in water, the same reasoning should be applicable because of the Supremacy
Clause. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Further, this conclusion is supported by case law which
says that the right to engage in interstate commerce is not a gift of a state that may be taken
away. Kansas Natural Gas, 221 U.S. at 260. See In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 558 (1891);
Comment, supra note 3, at 141.
71. State ex relDouglas v. Sporhase, 208 Neb. at 710, 305 N.W.2d at 619. This conten-
tion was put before the Court by amicus curiae briefs. E.g. Amicus Curiae Brief of the State
of California at 18-25, Sporhase, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
Seven amicus curiae briefs were filed in Sporhase. The City of El Paso, which has
sought to invalidate New Mexico's water export statute, see infra notes 156, 172, urged the
Court to apply dormant Commerce Clause analysis to water. Amicus Curiae Brief of the
City of El Paso at 5-13, Sporhase, 458 U.S. 941 (1982). Those filing briefs in opposition to
this application of the Commerce Clause were the State of California; the States of Colo-
rado, Kansas, Missouri, Nevada, North Dakota and South Dakota; the State of New Mex-
ico; four water districts in New Mexico from which El Paso sought to export water, the
National Agricultural Lands Center and Kansas City Southern Industries; and the National
Wildlife Federation and the Wildlife Federations of Colorado and Nebraska.
72. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 952-53. See supra note 26. A related argument is that because
water is essential to the entire economic vitality of the West, see supra note 21, states should
be able to prohibit the export of water from the state in which it is withdrawn. Such a claim
is really only an argument for economic protectionism. Statutes effecting economic protec-
tionism are "virtuallyperse invalid." Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)
(economic protectionism not purpose but effect of statute); H.P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at
538 (economic protectionism the purpose of statute); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511,
523 (1935) (rejecting argument that statute effecting economic protectionism was health-
oriented despite the possibility of starvation as a result of unemployment).
73. Sporhae, 458 U.S. at 953. See supra note 26.
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source.
74
D. Arguments that Support Treating Water as an Item of Commerce
Several arguments were proferred in Sporhase to support treating
water as an item of commerce. One argument is that, for purposes of
commerce, there is no logical distinction between water and every other
natural resource; if other natural resources are considered items of
commerce, water should be accorded the same treatment.75
A second argument utilized by the majority in Sporhase is that
since Congress has the power to regulate ground water in Nebraska,
water should be considered an item of commerce. 76 This rationale was
criticized by Justice Rehnquist in his dissent. Rehnquist felt that it was
improper for the Court to determine the validity of congressional regu-
lation of ground water when no such regulation was before the Court.7 7
More to the point, Justice Rehnquist asserted that it is not necessary
that ground water be an item of commerce in order for it to be regu-
lated by Congress.
78
A third argument advanced by the Court in Sporhase is actually a
rebuttal to the contention that water should not be an item of com-
merce. In sum, the Court asserted that the Western States' interest in
conserving scarce water supplies would be adequately protected by in-
cluding water as an article of commerce. 79 The majority reasoned that
74. Id. Cf. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (interstate surface water should
be apportioned among the states involved). It was contended that invalidating the Nebraska
statute in Sporhase would seriously damage an already existing de facto apportionment of
the waters of the Ogallala aquifer. Amicus Curiae Brief of the States of Colorado, Kansas,
Missouri, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming, at 10, Sporhase, 458
U.S. 941 (1982). Compare infra notes 216-17 and accompanying text with text accompanying
note 152.
75. 458 U.S. at 951-52. See also Corker, Transbasin Diverson, supra note 5, at 146 n.40.
Ladd, supra note 5, at 310; McDaniel, supra note 5, at 538 ("no serious lawyer would argue
today that water is not an article of commerce"); Comment, supra note 3, at 139. But see
Martz & Grazis, supra note 3, at 61; WATER POLICIES, supra note 2, at 319. Query why the
Supreme Court would equitably apportion water if it is truly indistinguishable from all
other natural resources, which are not so apportioned.
76. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 953-54.
77. Id. at 961 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
78. Id. Justice Rehnquist relied on cases holding that Congress may regulate activities
which affect interstate commerce, including United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) and
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Rehnquist reasoned that if ground water with-
drawals sufficiently affected interstate commerce, Congress could regulate ground water
even though it was not itself an item of commerce.
Justice Rehnquist contended that the scope of the restrictions placed upon state regula-
tion by the dormant Commerce Clause is less expansive than the scope of Congress' affirma-
tive Commerce Clause powers. Id. Dicta in Hughes, however, states that the scope of both
aspects of the Commerce Clause power is the same. 441 U.S. at 326 n.2. But cf. infra notes
117-22.
79. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 953-54.
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water conservation would be considered an important state interest in
the Commerce Clause balancing test analysis.8 0 Based on these three
arguments, the Court concluded that water is an item of commerce.,"
III. The Validity of the Nebraska Statute in Light of the
Commerce Clause
The Court began its discussion of the constitutionality of the Ne-
braska statute by noting that Congress has never exercised its authority
under the Commerce Clause to regulate ground water; therefore, Ne-
braska would not automatically be foreclosed from enacting ground
water regulations.8 2 The Court then examined whether the Commerce
Clause by itself invalidated the Nebraska regulation. This methodol-
ogy is commonly referred to as the dormant Commerce Clause
analysis.8 3
The dormant Commerce Clause analysis has not been free from
criticism. 4 One valid criticism is that there is no basis for such an
80. The test involves a comparison of state and federal interests. See infra text accom-
panying notes 115, 117-22.
81. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 953.
82. Id at 954. The Court's characterization of Congress' legislative inactivity in this
area is not entirely accurate. The Water Resources Development Act of 1976, § 193, (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 1962(d)-18 (1976)), authorized a study of the water resources of the High
Plains region overlying the Ogallala aquifer and the development of plans to increase water
supplies in the region. The Act states that "[i]f water transfer is found to be a part of a
reasonable solution, the Secretary [of Commerce], as part of his study, shall include a recom-
mended plan for allocating and distributing water in an equitable fashion, taking into ac-
count existing water rights and the needs for future growth of all affected areas." Id. Thus,
Congress has been preparing to regulate the water resources in the region.
83. See supra note 23. The Court has been developing this doctrine for some time. The
analysis was first used in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). See
Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370-71 (1976). Cooley held that a state
could regulate subjects best suited for local regulation, but not subjects that required a uni-
form nationwide system of regulation. Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319. The next deci-
sional phase in the dormant Commerce Clause analysis focused on whether the state
regulation put a direct or indirect burden on interstate commerce. See, e.g., Shafer v. Farm-
ers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189 (1925). The current dormant Commerce Clause analysis in-
volves a comparison between the state interest advanced by the regulation and the national
interest, which is often simply unburdened interstate commerce. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co.
v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). The standard expression of the current test is found in Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). See infra text accompanying note 115. See
generally L. TIUBE, supra note 42, §§ 6-2 to 6-5, at 320-27.
84. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 690 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 788-90 (1945) (Black,
J., dissenting); McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U.S. 176, 188-89 (1940) (Black, J.,
Douglas, J., & Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Anson & Schenkkan, Federalism, the Dormant
Commerce Clause, and State-OwnedResources, 59 TEx. L. REv. 71 (1980); Eule, Laying the
Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425 (1982); Henkin, Infallibility Under
Law Constitutional Balancing, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1022, 1027, 1037-43 (1978); Tushnet,
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analysis in the actual language of the Commerce Clause.85 Nonethe-
less, the Court often has acted to invalidate state regulations of com-
merce, and has justified its intervention either by referring to the
negative implications of the Commerce Clause or by presuming the in-
tent of a silent Congress.86 Several policy rationales have been offered
in support of federal court intervention. 7 Although several Justices
Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 125. But see infra note 89 and
accompanying text.
85. See L. TRIBE, supra note 42, § 6-2, at 320; Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 84, at 78-
80; Henkin, supra note 84, at 1037. For the text of the Commerce Clause, see supra note 1.
The records of the Constitutional Convention indicate that one intended purpose of the
then embryonic Commerce Clause was to empower the federal government to invalidate
oppressive state regulations of commerce. See Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitu-
tional Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 432, 470-72 (1941); I
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 256 (M. Farrand ed. 1937) (national
regulation of commerce is essential to assure interstate harmony); III RECORDS OF THE FED-
ERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra, at 547 (under the Articles of Confederation, states en-
acted "rival, conflicting and angry regulations"). Of course, statements of the Framers
should be used with extreme care when determining the meaning of a constitutional provi-
sion. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State Choice of Law" Due Process, 9 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 851, 895 (1982). In determining the general purpose of a particular
provision, however, examination of such statements is proper. See C. ANTIEAU, CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONSTRUCTION § 3.15, at 100 (1982); T. COOLEY, I A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE STATES OF
THE AMERICAN UNION 142 (8th ed. 1927). Where the purpose of the provision is clearly
described the Framers' statements are both valuable and satisfactory. Id. at 143. Of course,
the Framers' intent should not be used as a "straight-jacket" if modification is needed to
properly reflect current conditions. C. ANTIEAU, supra, § 3.15, at 98-105.
Several of the Federalist Papers also indicate that the Commerce Clause was intended
to give the federal government the power to invalidate oppressive state commerce regula-
tions. See THE FEDERALIST No. 7, at 37-38 (A. Hamilton), No. 11, at 65-66 (A. Hamilton),
No. 22, at 131-32 (A. Hamilton), No. 42, at 274-75 (J. Madison), No. 45, at 300-03 (J.
Madison), No. 56 at 366-68 (A. Hamilton or J. Madison) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1941). A passage
from a letter dated February 13, 1829, written to J.C. Cabell from James Madison is also
instructive: "[It] is very certain that [the power to regulate commerce among the several
states] grew out of the abuse of the power by the importing States in taxing the non-import-
ing, and was intended as a negative and preventive provision against injustice among the
states themselves." III RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra, at 478.
None of these sources suggests that the federal judiciary should have any role to play in
the invalidation of offensive state commerce regulations. In another context, however, one
Framer, Governor Robert Morris of Pennsylvania, suggested that the federal judiciary could
properly strike down state laws that violated the Constitution, and that Congress need not
act unless the judiciary failed to take any action. II RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVEN-
TION OF 1787, supra, at 28.
86. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768 (1945) and the cases cited
therein.
87. One rationale is the belief early in the Nation's history that Congress would be
unable to act because it would be stymied by the presence of competing factions. L. TRIBE,
supra note 42, § 6-3, at 321-22. This was the view of James Madison. Evidently, Madison
did not anticipate any problems because he felt that the States were clearly precluded from
regulating commerce except solely intrastate commerce. Id A related rationale is that Con-
gress might be too busy to address petty, diversified local matters and that inaction would
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have questioned the suitability of dormant Commerce Clause analysis
to particular situations,8 8 the Court as a whole has not questioned the
validity of the analysis itself for over one hundred years.89
A. Alternatives to the Traditional Dormant Commerce Clause Review
The Supreme Court has developed three alternate analyses that
might have been applied in Sporhase. One such analysis is the exemp-
tion of state participation in the market from dormant Commerce
Clause analysis.90 This exemption was summarized and relied upon in
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake.91 The case involved a state-run and state-owned
result in Balkanization of the states and suffocation of interstate commerce. Duckworth v.
Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 400 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring). See also Baldwin v. G.A.F.
Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 596
(1923). Justice Holmes declared that the Court's invalidation of state commerce regulations
had saved the Union by protecting interstate commerce from suffocation. O.W. HOLMES,
Law andthe Courtin THE HOLMES READER 66 (J. Marke ed. 1964) (Speech, Feb. 15, 1913).
Today these rationales may be outdated because of the substantial delegation of con-
gressional power to regulatory agencies. Eule, supra note 84, at 432-33; see also Tushnet,
supra note 84, at 165. Furthermore, the Court may not be well equipped to evaluate the
complex federalism concerns in such cases; the requisite evaluation of the economic, social
and political data is normally the province of the legislative branch. Anson & Schenkkan,
supra note 84, at 82; see Henkin, supra note 84, at 1041. Congress has superior investigative
and evaluative resources at its disposal. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761,
788-89 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 84, at 82-83. One
example of the Court's difficulty in making the determinations involved in the dormant
Commerce Clause analysis is the case of Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450
U.S. 662 (1981). Compare the plurality opinion in Kassel, 450 U.S. at 662 with the concur-
ring opinion, 450 U.S. at 679 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) and with the dissent-
ing opinion, 450 U.S. at 687 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Raymond Motor Transp.
Co. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978) (limitation on length of trucks unduly burdens interstate
commerce); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303, 177 (1938) (limita-
tion on width of trucks does not unduly burden interstate commerce).
A final problem with the dormant Commerce Clause analysis is that it may not be an
efficient mechanism for developing principles with which to govern state regulation of com-
merce. Unlike the Congress, the Court's power is limited to those state regulations that
become the subject of litigation. McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176,
188-89 (1940) (Black, Douglas & Frankfurter, JJ., dissenting).
88. See Brown, The Open Economy: Justice Frankfurter and the Position of the Judici-
ary, 67 YALE L.J. 219, 221-23 (1957); Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 84, at 84-85.
One commentator has suggested that evaluation of nondiscriminatory state commerce
regulations should be left to Congress and that the Court should evaluate discriminatory
state commerce regulations in light of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Eule, supra
note 84, at 437-55.
89, See supra note 85 for a brief discussion of the evaluation of dominant Commerce
Clause analysis. Apparently the last time the Court rejected the dormant Commerce Clause
analysis was in The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847). Chief Justice Taney opined
that the states were free to regulate interstate commerce unless the regulation conflicted with
an act of Congress. Id. at 578-79.
90. This originated in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
91. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
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cement mill in South Dakota. The Court held that the mill legitimately
could service the cement needs of South Dakota residents before those
of nonresidents. The majority reasoned that the success of the mill was
a result of the foresight, risk and industry of the state's residents and
thus the benefits could flow preferentially to the residents during times
of shortage.92 The Supreme Court distinguished cases involving the
regulation of natural resources and stated that the cement in this case
was an "end product of a complex process whereby a costly physical
plant and human labor act on raw materials."93 The Court set out sev-
eral factors it felt were important in the decision: (1) the state did not
seek to restrict the access of others to the raw materials; (2) the state did
not restrict competition; (3) the state did not have unique access to the
raw materials when compared to other states; and (4) the state-created
preference applied only to the first sale of cement and not to subse-
quent resales. 4
Although the Court in Sporhase recognized that the Nebraska sys-
tem of ground water regulation was in effect responsible for the contin-
uing availability of ground water in Nebraska,"95 ground water is not
the "end result of a complex process whereby a costly physical plant
and human labor act upon raw materials." 96 The raw materials and the
final product are identical in every way except that the former is some
distance underground and the latter is upon the overlying land.97 Fur-
ther, at least two of the factors present in Reeves are not present in
Sporhase: 1) the Nebraska regulation does restrict tbe access of non-
92. Id. at 446.
93. The Court distinguished Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (minnows), Phil-
adelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (landfill sites), Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,
262 U.S. 553 (1923) (natural gas), West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911)
(natural gas), simply by stating "[clement is not a natural resource like coal, wild game, or
minerals." 447 U.S. at 443-44.
94. 447 U.S. at 444 n.17.
95. 458 U.S. at 957.
96. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
97. Consider the California State Water Project in light of the Reeves analysis. Al-
though water from this project is used wholly in the State of California-and thus would not
seem to trigger the negative implications of the Commerce Clause-much of the water trans-
ported in the Project is used to irrigate crops that enter interstate commerce. GOVERNOR'S
OFFICE OF PLANNING & RESEARCH, CALIFORNIA WATER ATLAS 3, 84 (1979) (hereinafter
cited as CALIFORNIA WATER ATLAS). Because the use of the water affects interstate com-
merce, it if a proper subject for congressional regulation pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942). It is thus subject to dormant
Commerce Clause review. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. at 326 n.2 (1979).
The State Water Project is massive: it involves dams, hundreds of miles of concrete
canals and expenditures in excess of a billion dollars. CALIFORNIA WATER ATLAS supra, at
50-56. The water delivered by the Project is the end product of a complex process involving
both costly physical construction and human labor. Although the end product is fundamen-
tally the same as the "raw materials," it is arguably very different: water that is several
hundred miles from the desired place of use cannot be used there without first being trans-
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residents to the resource, and 2) the Nebraska regulation applies to any
transfer across state lines, not just initial transfers. In addition, it is
arguable that the Nebraska regulation restricts competition for the
ground water underlying the state by proscribing its use in a
nonreciprocating state. Thus, the Reeves rationale would not produce
an exemption from dormant Commerce Clause review in the situation
presented in Sporhase.
A second alternative is the analysis articulated in National League
of Cities v. Usery.9 8 In this case the Supreme Court considered the ap-
plicability of the Federal Labor Standards Act to state and municipal
employees.99 The Court held that the Act was inapplicable to state
government workers to the extent that it "operate[d] to directly displace
the State's freedom to structure integral operations in areas of tradi-
tional governmental functions.' '""o It was contended in Sporhase that
the regulation of water was a "traditional governmental function," and
thus beyond the reach of federal action pursuant to the Commerce
Clause.1o1
In Hodel v. Virginia Suiface Mining & Reclamation Association, °2
the Court set forth three prerequisites to the application of the National
League of Cities doctrine to limit federal commerce regulation. 103 The
first criterion is that the federal action must regulate the "States as
States.'" This requirement is not met where the federal action regu-
ported; by being transported, it has been changed into a form usable by the purchaser much
like the cement in Reeves.
The distinction in Reeves between the cement involved in that case and the natural
resources of other cases, see supra note 93, would seem to foreclose the application of the
market participant exemption, but water was not one of the resources expressly distin-
guished from cement. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 443-44. Thus, the fact that the product of the
State Water Project is a natural resource might not be controlling if all the other factors set
out in Reeves were present. On the other hand, commentators have argued that the Reeves
doctrine should not be applied in situations which are very different from that in Reeves; the
basis for this argument is that the exemption is based upon the much criticized governmen-
tal/proprietary distinction. See, e.g., Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 84, at 88-89.
98. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
99. The Court in NationalLeague of Cities examined the 1974 amendments to section 3
of the Act, 88 Stat. 60, codfed in 29 U.S.C. § 203 (x) (1976).
100. NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852. The Court gave the following examples
of "traditional governmental functions": fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, pub-
lic health, and parks and recreation. Id at 851. The majority noted that some such func-
tions remain unexpressed. See id at 851 n.16.
101. E.g., Amicus Curiae Brief for the State of California at 20, Sporhase, 458 U.S. 941
(1982).
102. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
103. Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 287-88 (1981) (citing National League of Cities,
426 U.S. at 845, 852, 854).
104. 452 U.S. at 287. The other two prerequisites are: (1) the regulation addresses mat-
ters that are "indisputably 'attribute[s] of state sovereignty' "; and (2) compliance with the
regulation would directly impair the state's "ability to 'structure integral operations in areas
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lates private conduct, even if the action serves to displace the states'
exercise of their police powers.'0 5 The Court's action in Sporhase--
declaring that interstate commerce in ground water among private in-
dividuals could not be unduly restricted by state regulations-was not a
regulation of the State of Nebraska itself.
Another significant distinction between Sporhase and National
League of Cities is that the latter case is an explication of the constraints
that the Tenth Amendment places on congressional action pursuant to
the Commerce Clause. 06 Sfporhase did not involve any congressional
action. It is worth noting that the National League of Cities doctrine
has been severely criticized by commentators'07 and on more than one
occasion simply ignored by the Court.'
A third alternative to the traditional dormant Commerce Clause
analysis was imparted in Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission of
Montana."9 In this case the Court upheld a Montana licensing scheme
that gave residents preferential treatment by setting nonresident fees
for elk hunting at several times the rate that residents were charged.
Because both Baldwin and Sporhase involve attempts by states to pro-
tect their renewable natural resources," 0 the reasoning in Baldwin ar-
guably could be used to uphold the Nebraska statute under challenge
in Sporhase. The fact that Baldwin is based on the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause rather than upon the Commerce Clause should not be
considered sufficient to distinguish the two cases; the Court has often
used Commerce Clause analysis to support reasoning in cases based on
the Privileges and Immunities Clause"' and could, conversely, use
Privileges and Immunities Clause analysis to support reasoning in
Commerce Clause cases. But Sporhase does not present the proper sit-
uation. The Court in Baldwin emphasized that the challenged state
action involved the sport of elk hunting and did not involve activities
of traditional governmental functions."' 452 U.S. 287-88 (quoting National League of Cit-
ies, 426 U.S. at 854, 845, 852). Justice Rehnquist, the author of the National League of Cities
opinion, indicated his acceptance of this articulation of the requirements of the doctrine.
See Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 775 (1982) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.).
105. Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 290-92.
106. Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 286-87. The Court expressly reserved the ques-
tion of whether the Tenth Amendment limited congressional exercise of the "authority
granted it under other sections of the Constitution." National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at
852 n.17.
107. Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 84, at 97. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 42, § 5-22,
at 309 (reasoning difficult to follow) and 318 (language is overinclusive).
108. Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 84, at 97 & nn.130-31. In Sporhase, neither the
majority nor the dissenting opinion mentions National League of Cities.
109. 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
110. See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 388; Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 953.
111. See supra note 51.
that were "a means to the non-resident's livelihood."" 2 This effectively
distinguishes Sporhase, where the appellants presumably earned their
living as farmers."
13
B. Application of the Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis
In Sporhase, the court utilized the dormant Commerce Clause
analysis set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.:" 4
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legiti-
mate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed
on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the
question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden
that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the
local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as
well with a lesser impact on interstate activities." 5
112. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 388.
113. An unlikely alternative to the analysis used by the Court in Sporhase was set forth
in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981). In that case, the Court
rejected a claim that "the Commerce Clause gives residents of one State a right of access at
'reasonable' prices to resources located in another State that is richly endowed with such
resources, without regard to whether and on what terms residents of the resource-rich State
have access to the resources." 1d at 619. If the appellants in Sporhase had challenged the
cost of the ground water they sought to export from Nebraska, this case would offer some
support for the position of the State of Nebraska. Instead, the appellants sought to vacate an
injunction that forbade them from transporting ground water pumped on their Nebraska
land for use on their Colorado land. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 941.
Commonwealth Edison involved a constitutional challenge to a severance tax on coal
extracted in Montana. Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 613. The Court indicated that
efforts by nonresidents to control the terms of resource development and depletion in an-
other state must be read in the context of state taxation of commerce. See id. at 619 (no right
to control resource development "in thisfashior') (emphasis added). In cases involving the
taxation of interstate commerce, the Court applies an entirely different analysis when evalu-
ating the burdens the challenged state measure places on interstate commerce. See Com-
plete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977); Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at
617. The fact that the Montana ta was upheld despite a disproportionate burden upon
nonresidents does not mean that a similar burden created by a state regulation would or
should be upheld. In cases involving state regulation of interstate commerce, the existence of
a disproportionate burden borne by nonresidents requires that the regulation be evaluated
under the strict scrutiny standard of review. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison,
340 U.S. 349 (1951).
114. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
115. Id at 142. This passage is commonly quoted in dormant Commerce Clause cases.
Hellerstein, Hughes v. Oklahoma: The Court, The Commerce Clause, and State Control of
Natural Resources, 1979 Sup. CT. REv. 51. It was quoted in Raymond Motor Transp. v.
Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441 (1978); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978);
Hughes, 441 U.S. 322, 331 (1979); Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, 447 U.S. 27, 36-37 (1980); and
most recently, Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 954.
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Applying this test, the Court found that the purpose of the Ne-
braska statute-the conservation and preservation of the diminishing
supply of ground water to assure its continued availability and use-to
be legitimate, highly important, and genuine.
16
The significance of the state's interest was underscored by the rea-
sons given for the Court's professed reluctance to invalidate the Ne-
braska regulation under dormant Commerce Clause analysis. First,
state regulation of the use of water in times of shortage is indispensable
to protect the health of the state's residents under its police power." 7
The Court noted, however, that the police power could not be used to
justify state actions to insure the health of the state economy.' s Sec-
ond, both the equitable apportionment decrees of the Supreme Court
and congressional sanction of interstate compacts that allocate water
resources have created a "legal expectation" that each state may restrict
the use of water within its borders. 1 9 Third, a state's claim of owner-
ship of ground water is logically more substantial than such a claim as
to other natural resources 20 and may justify the creation of a limited
preference in the citizens of that state as to water use.1 2 1 Fourth, the
Court observed that the efforts of Nebraska to assure the continuing
116. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 954-55. The Court noted that the conservation of a state's
natural resources is in the national interest as well as the producing state's interest.
Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 955 n.16 (quoting Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil and Gas Co.,
340 U.S. 179, 188 (1950)).
117. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 956.
118. Id. In times of severe economic crisis the distinction between the physical and eco-
nomic health of a state's citizens may cease to exist. The Court recognized the weaknesses in
this distinction nearly fifty years ago; persons whose economic health is poor (ie., those who
are destitute) are apt to find that their physical health suffers as a result (e.g., a person who is
starving to death for lack of money). See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523
(1935). Nonetheless, the Court continues to scrutinize closely state economic regulations,
reasoning "the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together." Id.
119. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 956. Indeed, if states cannot restrict the export of water within
their boundaries, there may not be any means to ensure that the water that is allocated to a
particular state is actually used in that state. The purpose of allocating water by interstate
compact or equitable apportionment is to guarantee an adequate and stable water supply. If
residents of one state are entirely free to export water from another state, and both states
have a specific amount or ratio allocated to them, the importing state win have effectively
increased its allocation at the expense of the exporting state. For a discussion of this issue as
it pertains to the Sporhase facts, see infra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
120. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 956.
121. Id The Court reasoned, however, that such a preference is not a valid basis for a
denial of federal regulatory power over ground water. Id.
The Court cited Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 533-34 (1978), to support the proposi-
tion that a state may create a limited preference in its own citizens in some aspects of its
exploitation of natural resources. Hicklin, however, neither sets out the circumstances in
which a state may create such a limited preference nor establishes the boundaries of such a
preference. Furthermore, in I-icklin, the Court invalidated a scheme in which the State of
Alaska had created a preference for its own citizens in the hiring of employees for various
aspects of the Alaska oil and gas industry. Id. at 534.
supply of ground water by enforcing conservation measures have
"some indicia of a good publicly produced and owned in which a state
may favor its own citizens in times of shortage." '22
Despite its reluctance to strike down the Nebraska statute, the
Court proceeded to evaluate the first three conditions of the statute
even though those conditions were not challenged by the appellants.
2 3
The statute provided four conditions under which the Director of the
Department of Water Resources of Nebraska must issue a permit for
the transfer of ground water out of the State. 24 The first three condi-
tions state that the withdrawal must: (1) be reasonable; (2) not be con-
trary to the conservation and use of ground water; and (3) not be
otherwise detrimental to the public welfare. 125 The Court commented
that these conditions apply only to interstate transfers of ground water
and suggested that there are reasons to accord special treatment to such
transfers. 126 The Court concluded that these conditions were not dis-
criminatory because Nebraska imposed severe withdrawal and use re-
strictions on use of ground water within the State.' 2 7 Apparently,
Nebraska's "evenhandedness" justified the first three conditions of the
statute. 128
The Court gave the fourth condition of the statute a more thor-
ough evaluation. This condition provides that ground water can be
transferred out of Nebraska, only if the state to which the water is to be
122. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957, (citing Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980)). In
Reeves, the presence of all of the indicia convinced the Court to uphold the decision of the
State of South Dakota to prefer its own citizens in the allocation of cement, a manmade
resource. See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
123. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957. The Court stated that these conditions were only given a
facial examination and thus might be invalid in less arid regions of Nebraska. Id
In Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979), the Court stated that a party chal-
lenging a state regulation on the grounds that it is discriminatory has the burden of showing
such discrimination. In Sporhase there was no such showing.
124. NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978). The full text of the statute is quoted at supra
note 27.
125. NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-613.0 (1978).
126. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 955. The Court did not explicate these reasons. Presumably
they are the reasons the Court gave when discussing its reluctance to apply the dormant
Commerce Clause analysis to state regulation of water. See text accompanying supra notes
117-22 and accompanying text.
127. Sporhase, 458 U.S. 955-56.
128. The Court added that the district of Nebraska in which the appellants' well is lo-
cated may apply even more stringent restrictions on intrastate ground water use than the
first three statutory conditions apply to interstate transfers. Id at 958. The appellants' well
was located in a critical township in the Upper Republican Natural Resources District. The
district had promulgated additional rules that mandated the installation of flow meters on
wells, limited the amount of water that may be used to irrigate each acre and the number of
acres that may be irrigated, and required that wells be spaced a certain minimum distance
apart. Furthermore, ground water could be transferred only for use on land controlled by
the person who controls the land from which it was withdrawn. Id.
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transferred would grant a reciprocal right to allow ground water with-
drawn in that state to be transferred to Nebraska. 29 Because Colorado
prohibited the transfer of ground water from Colorado into any other
state, 30 the reciprocity provision of the Nebraska statute erected an
absolute barrier to the transfer of ground water from Nebraska into
Colorado.
Under dormant Commerce Clause analysis, Nebraska thus had
the burden of justifying this restriction on interstate commerce by
showing that the reciprocity condition closely furthers the purpose be-
hind it.' 31 In Sporhase, the state failed to meet this burden. The Court
observed that the statute would operate to prohibit the exportation of
ground water from Nebraska even in a situation where the ground
water supply was abundant or excessive and the most beneficial use for
the water was in a neighboring state that did not allow the exportation
of its ground water into Nebraska. 132 The majority added that the reci-
procity provision did not significantly advance the purpose of achieving
conservation beyond the protections afforded by the first three condi-
tions.13 3 Thus, the Supreme Court held that the fourth condition could
not survive the "strictest scrutiny" given to facially discriminatory
regulations. 134
Some commentators have taken issue with the Court's position
that statutes requiring reciprocity as a condition for allowing export of
a particular item should be invalid. 35 Indeed, the Court has held that
129. NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978).
130. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-136 (1974). This statute is virtually identical to the stat-
ute upheld by the Court in Hudson County, 209 U.S. 349 (1908), except for the fact that it
applies to ground water instead of surface water. Compare Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957 n.17
with Hudson County, 209 U.S. at 353.
131. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 958. In support of this proposition, the Court cited Hughes,
441 U.S. 322 (1979) and Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. 349 (1951). This burden arises once the
challenger demonstrates discrimination against interstate commerce. A state also must show
that there is not a nondiscriminatory alternative which adequately would further the state
interest. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336. Compare the treatment of the first three conditions, supra
note 123.
132. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 958. This is precisely what led the Chief Justice of the Ne-
braska Supreme Court to dissent from the majority opinion that upheld the statute. See
State ex rel Douglas v. Sporhase, 208 Neb. 703, 713, 305 N.W.2d 614, 620 (1981).
133. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 958. In effect, the Court stated that the first three conditions
of the statute are a less discriminatory alternative to the reciprocity provision. Cf Hughes,
441 U.S. at 336; Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 354.
134. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 958 (citing Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337). In Hughes, the Court
stated that facially discriminatory state regulations invoked at least strict scrutiny if notper
seinvalidation. 441 U.S. at 337. The Court in Sporhase went on to suggest factual situations
in which a state regulation of water might survive strict scrutiny. 458 U.S. at 958. See infra
text accompanying notes 170-72.
135. See Martz & Grazis, supra note 3, at 63; Note, supra note 5, at 1277 (reciprocity
statutes may survive Commerce Clause scrutiny); Comment, Water Anti-Exportation Stat-
utes, supra note 5, at 627; Comment, supra note 3, at 142-43.
WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
voluntary reciprocity agreements are not per se violations of the Com-
merce Clause. 136 Two purposes have been advanced to support reci-
procity statutes not enacted as part of an agreement among states.
First, it has been contended that a state should be able to deter poten-
tial discrimination against it by another state before any such discrimi-
nation occurs (an offensive use).' 37 Second, it has been contended that
a state should be able to respond in kind to the discriminatory legisla-
tion of a neighboring state rather than sacrificing its own economic
growth (a defensive use).'
38
The Supreme Court rejected both arguments in Great Alantic &
Pacjiic Tea Co. v. Cottrell139 In discussing the offensive use of reci-
procity statutes, the Court reasoned that a state may seek voluntary
reciprocity with another state, but it may not use the threat of economic
isolation to compel a neighbor into a reciprocal agreement. 40 Turning
to the defensive use, the Court ruled that a state should seek to lift the
embargo of the neighboring state by mounting a Commerce Clause
challenge to the embargo; to respond in kind could lead to a multiplica-
tion of such statutes-the sort of situation the Commerce Clause was
designed to prevent.'
4'
In sum, the position taken by the Court in its treatment of reci-
procity provisions as expressed in Great At/antic & Pac/ic Tea Co. and
Sporhase is more consistent with the purpose of the Commerce Clause.
By striking down the reciprocity provision of the Nebraska statute, the
Court correctly applied the federalist principles underlying the Com-
merce Clause.' 4
2
IV. Congressional Authorization for the States to Regulate
Water Exempt from Commerce Clause Scrutiny
Congress can expressly authorize a state to regulate an activity in
such a way that it would otherwise be considered an unreasonable bur-
136. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 378 (1976). It should be noted
that most interstate compacts involve voluntary reciprocal agreements. See J. MuYs, IN-
TERSTATE WATER COMPACTS: THE INTERSTATE COMPACT AND FEDERAL-INTERSTATE
COMPACT 294 (1971) (Legal Study 14 prepared for the National Water Commission); STATE
WATER LAWS, supra note 12, at 70.
137. See, e.g., Martz & Grazis, supra note 3, at 63.
138. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 3, at 142. This probably was one of the purposes of
the Nebraska statute. Now that the Nebraska reciprocity provision has been invalidated,
Colorado may import Nebraska ground water but not vice versa.
139. 424 U.S. 366 (1976). But cf. W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 451 U.S.
648 (1981) (retaliatory state tax upheld).
140. 424 U.S. at 378-79.
141. Id at 379-81.
142. For a discussion of the purpose of the Commerce Clause, see supra note 85.
Winter 19841
308 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 11:283
den on interstate commerce. 143 It was argued in Sporhase that Con-
gress had given such express authorization. 144 This argument is based
upon a congressional deference to state water laws expressed in thirty-
seven federal statutes and in numerous interstate compacts.145  The
Court in Sporhase did not question the fact that Congress did defer to
state water laws in numerous instances; instead, the Court examined
whether that deference was sufficient to exempt the Nebraska statute
from Commerce Clause analysis.
The Court focused on one of the statutes, section 8 of the Recla-
mation Act of 1902,146 as typical of the other thirty-six statutes. 47 Sec-
tion 8 provides that "nothing in this [Act] shall be construed as
affecting or intended to affect or in any way interfere with the laws of
any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or dis-
tribution of water used in irrigation ... . 14 The Court concluded
that this provision only established the limit of the preemptive effect of
the Act upon state law.
149
143. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 451 U.S. at 652-53. See L. TRIBE, supra note 42, § 6-31, at 401
and cases cited therein.
144. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 958-60.
145. Id.; California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653 (1978). These statutes have been
compiled in Federal-State Water Rights: Hearings on S. 1275 Before the Subcomm. on Irri-
gation and Reclamation of the Senate Comm on Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. 302-10 (1964). For an analysis of some of these statutes as well as some more recent
provisions of similar effect, see California v. United States, 438 U.S. at 653-70.
An interstate compact is similar to a treaty between states. Ladd, supra note 5, at 275
and n.38. The compact is drafted to deal with a situation involving more than one state, and
generally must be authorized by Congress, which may show its consent by enacting a statute
setting out the compact. The power to compact derives by implication from the Constitu-
tion. See infra notes 230-38 and accompanying text for a more thorough discussion.
146. Reclamation Act, ch. 1093, § 8, 32 Stat. 390, (codified in 43 U.S.C. § 372, 383
(1976)).
147. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 959.
148. 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1976).
149. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 959. The Court also quoted another passage from 42 U.S.C.
§ 383, which requires that "the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of
this Act, shall proceed in conformity with such [state water] laws ...." 42 U.S.C. § 383
(1976). The majority declared that the effect of this passage is similarly limited to Federal
Reclamation Projects. Id.
Although the statute may be expressive of a congressional intent to defer generally to
state water law, the language employed does limit the deference to the Reclamation Act.
Bills have been introduced into Congress that would subject all federal water activities to
state water law. See, e.g., S. 863, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); S. 863, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1957) (the "Barrett Bill"). See also Corker, Water Rights and Federalism-The Western
Water Rights Settlement Bill of 1957, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 604, 635-37 (1957). Neither bill
passed. Trelease, Federal Limitations on State Water Law, 10 BUFFALO L. REv., 399, 426
(1961). In 1981, a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives that would prohibit
the interstate transfer of water unless the following conditions existed: (1) an interstate com-
pact was formed of all states (a) in the drainage basin (surface water source), or (b) affected
by the same aquifer (ground water source); and (2) all those states consented to the transfer.
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The Court then turned briefly to interstate compacts, giving a short
description of the function of the interstate compacts presented by the
appellee. The Court also mentioned, but did not analyze, two inter-
state compacts relating to waters flowing in rivers near appellants'
property.1 50 These compacts allocate surface water flowing in interstate
streams, in contrast to the ground water involved in Sfporhase. Ground
water and surface water flowing in nearby streams, however, are inte-
grally related. An increase in the withdrawal of ground water de-
creases the amount of water available for the surface flow of nearby
streams,' 5 1 thus affecting any allocation of the surface flow that might
be established by an interstate compact.1
52
Arguably, the ground water involved in Sporhase was explicitly or
implicitly governed by an interstate compact. There are, however, two
weaknesses in this argument. First, neither of the two compacts allo-
cating water in rivers near the appellants' property contained a provi-
sion that expressly included ground water within their scope.'
5 3
Second, there was no showing that the ground water withdrawn by ap-
pellants would have reached one of the nearby rivers but for the with-
drawal. if there had been such a showing, invalidation of the
reciprocity provision could undermine the allocation established by
that compact,15 4 which was created with congressional consent.155 The
H.R. 5278, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H9928 (1981). This bill was referred to the
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, id, and apparently died there.
150. 458 U.S. at 959. These two agreements are: the South Platte River Compact, Act of
Mar. 8, 1976, ch. 46, 44 Stat. 195 (1926) (between Colorado and Nebraska) [hereinafter cited
as South Platte River Compact] and the Republican River Compact, Act of May 26, 1943, ch.
104, 57 Stat. 86 (between Colorado, Kansas and Nebraska) [hereinafter cited as Republican
River Compact].
151. Bower, Some Physical, Technological, and Economic Characteristics of Water and
Water Resources Systems: mplicationsforAdminitration, 3 NAT. RESOURCES J. 215, 218-19
(1963); Clark, Water Law andHydrology, 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 17 (R. Clark ed.
1967); WATER POLICIES, supra note 2, at 233-34. The only ground water that does not reach
surface streams is lost to evapotranspiration (evaporated or consumed by plants) or flows
underground directly to the ocean. The amount of ground water in these two categories is
insignificant in comparison to the ground water that does reach surface streams. In fact, it is
ground water that makes possible most of the flow of most streams in the dry season. Clark,
supra, at 17 n.47 (discussing U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, Water Supply
Paper 1800, at 13 (1963)).
152. See, e.g., Upper Niobrara River Compact, Pub. L. No. 91-52, 83 Stat. 86 (1969).
This compact between Nebraska and Wyoming provides that the effects of ground water
withdrawal upon the quantity of surface flows in the Niobrara River should be studied in
anticipation of future apportionment of ground water in the river basin. 1d at 89.
153. See South Platte River Compact, supra note 150. Republican River Compact, supra
note 150.
154. For example, appellants could export part of Nebraska's allocation into Colorado,
thereby in effect increasing Colorado's allocation in contravention of the terms of the inter-
state compact.
155. See J. MuYs, supra note 136, at 172-74; Ladd, supra note 5, at 275.
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facts presented in Sporhase, however, do not support a contention that
either of the two interstate compacts would be undermined by the in-
validation of the reciprocity provision.
156
The Court concluded that Congress' general deference to state
water laws, as evidenced by the many federal statutes approving inter-
state compacts, does not mean that Congress intended to wholly re-
move state water regulation from dormant Commerce Clause
review.157 The majority distinguished cases which held that Congress
consented to the imposition of otherwise unreasonable burdens upon
interstate commerce on the ground that in those cases congressional
156. Consider, however, the situation before the district court in City of El Paso v. Reyn-
olds, 563 F.Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983). The City of El Paso sought to obtain much needed
water supplies from certain New Mexico aquifers located adjacent to the Rio Grande River
basin, and to that end sought to have the court invalidate a New Mexico statute prohibiting
the exportation of ground water. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-19 (1978); see infra note 172.
The ground water basins in which the aquifers are located are hydrologically connected with
the surface flow of the Rio Grande River. City ofEl Paso, slip op. at 23; see Flint, Ground-
water Law and Administration: A New Mexico Viewpoint, 14 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
545, 551-52 (1968). The surface flow of the Rio Grande River was divided among Colorado,
New Mexico, and Texas by the Rio Grande Compact, Act of May 31, 1939, ch. 155, 53 Stat.
785. Because the surface flow is interconnected with adjacent ground water basins, proper
implementation of the compact requires conjunctive management of the adjacent ground
water as well as the surface water, at least below the Elephant Butte Dam in central New
Mexico. City of El Paso, slip op. at 23-24. See Reynolds & Mutz, Water Deliveries under the
Rio Grande Compact, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 201, 203 (1974).
It was contended in the district court proceeding that the Rio Grande Compact proba-
bly would be undermined if the City of El Paso was allowed to export New Mexico ground
water. City ofEl Paso, slip op. at 10. See Utton, The El Paso Case: Reconciling Sporhase
and Vermeo, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. ix (1983). The court rejected this contention, giving
two reasons. First, the compact did not control the ground water from the adjacent ground
water basins, City of El Paso, slip op. at 23, although it was recognized that the pumping of
ground water eventually would reduce the surface flow of the Rio Grande River. Id. at 14.
The second and primary reason was that nothing in the compact negotiations, terms, nor
subsequent interpretations suggested that the compact intended to effect an apportionment
of the water in the Rio Grande River below the Elephant Butte Dam; instead, the water was
apportioned among users in Colorado, users in New Mexico above the dam, and users below
the dam in New Mexico and Texas. Id. at 13, 15-20. See Rio Grande Compact, supra, arts.
III, IV.
The court also rejected an argument made in reliance upon Arizona v. California, 373
U.S. 546 (1962), that the contracts with water users below the dam effected an apportion-
ment of those waters. City of ElPaso, slip op. at 20-22. The court also ruled that even if the
compact did in fact apportion both the surface flow and the hydrologically connected
ground water between users in New Mexico and Texas, use of New Mexico ground water in
Texas would not necessarily affect that apportionment because the surface water rights of
New Mexico users below the dam need not be impaired by the reduced surface water flow.
Id. at 24. The court reasoned that the New Mexico State Engineer had power to condition
any ground water permits issued to the city and could thus insure that surface water users in
Texas would bear the brunt of the surface water reduction rather than New Mexico surface
water users. Id at 24, 31-32.
157. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 959-60. The Court stated that the negative implications of the
Commerce Clause are part of all state water laws. Id.
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consent was "expressly stated."1 58 The Court did not find express con-
gressional consent in Sporhase.'5 9
Prior to Sporhase, there was doubt about the effect of the Com-
merce Clause on state water exportation statutes similar to the Ne-
braska regulation.160 Therefore, it can be argued that Congress
intended to consent to such statutes, but did not expressly state its con-
sent because it was unaware of the necessity to do so. Nevertheless,
even if it is true that Congress did not consider state regulation of water
to be subject to dormant Commerce Clause review, the failure of Con-
gress to pass a bill expressly establishing federal deference to state
water laws,1 61 strongly indicates that Congress never intended to con-
sent to state water exportation statutes.
Thus, the Court appropriately concluded that Congress did not in-
tend to consent to restrictions on interstate commerce in water effected
by the fourth condition of the Nebraska statute. Rather than invalidat-
158. Id. The Court relied on New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331,
343 (1982), which quotes Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 427 (1946). Pruden-
tialinvolved the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1982) (originally enacted as ch.
20, 1, 59 Stat. 33-34 (1945)), which, the Court noted, states that "'silence on the part of the
Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such
[insurance] business by the several States."' Prudential, 328 U.S. at 429 (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 1011). The Act further provides that the insurance business "shall be subject to the laws of
the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business." 328 U.S. at
429 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a)). Thus, Commerce Clause limitations on state regulation
of insurance were removed. 328 U.S. at 429-30.
Another area in which state regulations that conflict with dormant Commerce Clause
restrictions, but have been upheld because they were authorized by Congress, is state regula-
tion of the importing of alcohol. The Court suggested such authorization in Leisy v. Hardin,
135 U.S. 100 (1890) and upheld it in In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 548 (1891) (interpreting the
Wilson Act, codified at 27 U.S.C. § 127 (1976), which was passed in response to the sugges-
tion in Leiry). See L. TRIBE, supra note 42, § 6.3 1, at 403 n. 13. These two cases may be cited
as authority for the proposition that Congress can consent to the imposition of otherwise
unreasonable burdens on interstate commerce; however, their precedential value may be
limited by the fact that they were decided in a different era of Commerce Clause analysis.
159. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 960 (by implication).
160. See supra note 5.
161. See S. 863, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); S. 863, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) (The
"Barrett Bill") (quoted in Corker, supra note 149, at 635-37 (Appendices I & II)). The "Bar-
rett Bill" provided that "all unappropriated navigable and non-navigable ground and sur-
face waters are reserved for appropriation and use of the public pursuant to State law, and
rights to the use of such waters for beneficial purposes shall be acquired under State laws
relating to the appropriation, control, use, and distribution of such water." S. 863, § 6, 85th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1957). It also provided that "[n]either the proprietorship functions of the
United States . . .nor the exercise of its powers relating to interstate commerce and the
general welfare should be permitted unduly to interfere with prior rights to the use of water
or the orderly acquisition of such rights in the future." S. 863, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2
(1957). Had this bill become law, the argument that Congress had deferred to state law,
thereby permitting otherwise unreasonable burdens on interstate commerce, would be much
more compelling. To date no such bill has been passed by Congress. See supra note 149.
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ing the entire statute, the Court remanded the case to the State of Ne-
braska for a determination of whether the invalid reciprocity provision
is severable.1
62
V. Implications of Sporhase for Future Resource Planning
It remains to be seen what impact Sporhase will have on water
resource allocation. Although the decision is consistent with the mod-
em trend of dormant Commerce Clause analysis, the Court probably
did not fully anticipate the ramifications of subjecting state regulation
of water resources to dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. A predic-
tion of these ramifications must be speculative because the application
of dormant Commerce Clause analysis to state water management is
such a recent and dramatic change in the law, even if not entirely
unexpected.
It should be kept in mind that the Sporhase decision involved a
highly unusual factual situation: the land from which the water was
withdrawn and the land upon which the water was used were both
owned by the appellants, despite the fact that the two adjacent parcels
were located in different states. 63 Additionally, the Ogallala aquifer,
which is the source from which the water was withdrawn, underlies
both parcels of land as well as portions of several other states. 164 Thus,
Sporhase does not truly present a situation in which water originating
entirely within one state is exported for use in another state. The anal-
ysis used in Sporhase probably would be applied to such a situation
because the Court did not limit its holding to the facts of the case.
1 65
A. Alternatives for States to Preserve their Finite Wate- Resources
It is important to determine exactly what Sporhase does and does
not establish. Close reading of the opinion reveals the decision neither
validates reasonable use conditions on water export nor requiresper se
invalidation of reciprocity or complete embargo statutes.
In Sporhase, the first three conditions of the Nebraska water stat-
ute-that the use be reasonable, consistent with conservation, and not
detrimental to the public welfare-were upheld. In circumstances dif-
ferent from those presented in Sporhase, however, it should not be pre-
sumed that the Supreme Court would uphold a similar state statute. 166
The language in Sporhase suggesting that a state could legitimately
162. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 960.
163. Id.
164. See supra note 26.
165. This is evident from the dicta anticipating the application of the dormant Com-
merce Clause doctrine to other factual circumstances. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957-58.
166. See supra note 127. But cf. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 959-60 and supra text accompany-
ing notes 117-21.
place more restrictions on water that is exported than it does on intra-
state water use 67 should not be read expansively. First, the opinion
clearly indicates that the Court did not consider its Commerce Clause
inquiry into the first three conditions to be thorough. 168 Second, the
Court's emphasis on the restrictions placed on intrastate ground water
use in the district of Nebraska from which the appellants sought to
export water demonstrates that the result might be different if intrastate
ground water withdrawal and use were not so severely restricted. 1
69
On the other hand, the fact that the Court in Sporhase struck down
the reciprocity provision of the Nebraska statute does not necessarily
mean that similar provisions would be struck down in other circum-
stances. 170 The Court hypothesized a situation in which the actual ef-
fect of the reciprocity statute more closely fits the conservation purpose.
The hypothetical circumstances are as follows: (1) the state as a whole
has a water shortage; (2) intrastate water transfer from areas with a
surplus to areas of need is feasible; and (3) the importation of water
from a reciprocating state would serve to compensate for any water
exported into that state.' 7' The Court also suggested that "a demon-
strably arid state conceivably might be able to marshall evidence..."
that a total embargo of water was closely related to a conservation pur-
pose. 172 Thus, the Court seems prepared to examine future challenges
167. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 956-57. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 123.
169. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 953-56. The opinion suggests that the same conditions
upheld in Sporhase might be invalid if applied in areas of Nebraska where the intrastate
restrictions on water use were not as strict as the provisions in appellants' district. Id Of
course, if intrastate water use and transfer were wholly unrestricted, the situation would be
very close to City of Altus, and the result probably would be the same as in that case.
170. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957-58. See also supra text accompanying notes 117-22.
171. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957-58. The burden of showing that these characteristics are
present is on the state seeking to justify such a statute. This burden will be difficult to
overcome. The Court stated that if these characteristics are present, the conservation pur-
pose "might be credibly advanced for the reciprocity provision." Id (emphasis added). The
Court need not accept the purpose advanced even if the characteristics are all present.
172. Id. (emphasis added). The emphasized words indicate that the burden on a state
seeking to justify such a statute will be formidable. The state must first show that it is
sufficiently arid and then must show that the embargo statute is closely related to conserva-
tion (and presumably that there is no reasonable nondiscriminatory alternative). See supra
notes 116, 131, 133 and accompanying text.
A district court recently struck down a New Mexico statute of this type in City of El
Paso, 563 F.Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983).
The New Mexico statute at issue provided in pertinent part that "[n]o person shall with-
draw water from any underground source in New Mexico for use in any other state." N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 72-12-19 (1978). The district court relied on Sporhase and the dormant Com-
merce Clause reasoning therein. See City ofEl Paso, at 388.
Arguably, the New Mexico statute could have been upheld as being closely related to a
conservation purpose because of New Mexico's arid climate. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957-
58. There are many indications that New Mexico is an arid state: nearly all of the state
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to water export statutes on a case-by-case basis. Even so, a state that is
defending a reciprocity statute or a complete embargo statute should
not be too optimistic about the possibility of success. Although al-
lowances are made for the special nature of water, 173 a statute that dis-
criminates against nonresident users must survive strict scrutiny.174 A
further obstacle is that the statute might be evaluated not as it applies
in the actual circumstances before the court, but rather as it might ap-
ply in a hypothetical situation drawn in a manner unfavorable to the
statute.175  Thus, most commentators believe that embargo and reci-
procity statutes would not survive strict scrutiny if challenged under the
Commerce Clause.
176
Another type of statute designed to restrict water exportation is a
statute declaring that certain uses of water are nonbeneficial. 177 Such
statutes in effect prevent the exportation of water for that use. There-
fore, the validity of the statute should depend upon whether the state
receives less than 16 inches of rain annually, and the state only averages 60 days per year in
which there is even measurable rainfall. See THE NATIONAL ATLAS, supra note 15, at 97.
Furthermore, most of the state averages at least 3200 hours of annual sunshine, see id. at 96,
thereby evaporating much of the water from the meager rainfall. Nevertheless, the court
rejected the claim that the embargo statute was closely related to a conservation purpose
because the state failed to show that the intrastate transportation of water was "feasible
regardless of distance." City of El Paso, at 390-91, (citing Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 958). In
addition, the court suggested that the true purpose of the New Mexico statute was economic
protectionism. City of El Paso, at 391. The result in City ofEl Paso is consistent with Com-
merce Clause doctrine. Even if the true purpose of a statute is conservation, it is unconstitu-
tional for a state to export the burden of conservation by refusing to permit the use of a
natural resource out of the state when an identical use within the state would be substan-
tially unrestricted. See Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337.
173. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
174. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 958. See Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337. A discriminatory water
export statute probably would not be declared per se invalid because of the special nature of
water. See supra text accompanying notes 117-22.
175. See, e.g., Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957. The Nebraska reciprocity provision was ex-
amined by the Court using a hypothetical situation posed by Nebraska Supreme Court
Chief Justice Krivosha, State ex rel Douglas v. Sporhase, 208 Neb. at 713, 305 N.W.2d at
620 (Krivosha, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), in which water was abundant
or excessive and the most beneficial use was in a nonreciprocating state. In the circum-
stances before the Court in Sporhase, water was clearly neither excessive nor abundant. See
supra note 128.
176. See, e.g., Corker, Transbasin Diversions, supra note 5, at 148; Ladd, supra note 5, at
311; Comment, supra note 3, at 146. But see Martz & Grazis, supra note 3, at 63 (reciprocity
statutes are undoubtedly valid); Comment, Water Anti-Exportation Statutes, supra note 5, at
629-30. See also Note, supra note 5, at 1277 (reciprocity statutes may survive constitutional
scrutiny).
177. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-104 (1983) (coal slurry pipeline a nonbeneficial
water use). Certain states have enacted such statutes to prevent the use of local water in out
of state coal slurry pipelines. For a more thorough discussion of the issues involved in these
statutes, see Ladd, supra note 5, at 311; Martz & Grazis, supra note 3, at 63; McDaniel, supra
note 5, at 543-47; Note, supra note 5, at 1277.
can justify the statute under strict scrutiny review in light of the factors
suggested by the Court in Sporhase: the state should have a water
shortage and be able to transfer water within the state as needed.'
78
Some states have enacted area of origin statutes that restrict the
exportation of water from the area in which the water originates.
79
178. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 958. See supra text accompanying notes 117-22. Even though
these statutes are facially neutral, if they have a discriminatory e6fect they are subject to strict
scrutiny. Cf. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
179. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10505, 11460 (West 1971). These statutes allow
interim water use out of the area of origin subject to termination by local users when the
water is necessary for local development and proper application is made to the State Water
Resources Control Board. 25 OP. CAL. A'r'y GEN. 8, 27 (1955). These laws may offer only
limited protection to the area of origin. First, they apparently reserve only that water which
falls as precipitation in the area of origin. Robie & Kletzing, Area of Origin Statutes--the
California Experience, 15 IDAHO L. REv. 419, 432-33 (1979). Second, they only apply to
certain appropriations made by the federal government or the state; appropriations by pri-
vate parties are excluded from their scope. See CAL. WATER CODE § 10505 (limited to as-
signment or release from priority of state filings); id. at § 11460 (originally limited to state
Central Valley Project but extended to encompass the Federal Central Valley Project, id at
§ 11128, and the State Water Project, id at § 12931); Robie & Kletzing, supra, at 432-33.
The State Water Resources Control Board, however, has often imposed conditions upon
permits to appropriate water in other situations which protect the area of origin. See Robie
& Kletzing, supra, at 431-33. In addition, because ground water is not included in the Cali-
fornia water permit system, see CAL. WATER CODE § 1200 (West 1971), it appears to be
beyond the scope of these statutes.
CAL. WATER CODE § 10505 provides a preference for users within the county in which
the water originates; it does not distinguish among watersheds therein. 25 OP. CAL. ATT'Y
GEN. 8, 17 (1955). This section was enacted in response to public outcry over the water
gathering activities of Los Angeles in the Owens Valley in eastern California. Robie &
Kletzing, supra, at 422.
CAL. WATER CODE § 11460 gives a preference to users within the "watershed or area in
which the water originates, or an area immediately adjacent thereto which can be conve-
niently supplied with water therefrom." In a case involving water of the San Joaquin River
that was impounded behind Friant Dam, the United States Supreme Court interpreted this
statute to include all areas that could be "conveniently supplied with water" without regard
for whether they were 'immediately adjacent.' Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627, 630
(1963). Some areas served by Friant Dam are more than 100 miles from the dam. See Rank
v. (Krug) United States, 142 F. Supp. 1, 40-41 (S.D. Cal. 1956) (maps of Friant-Kern Canal);
CALIFORNIA WATER ATLAS, supra note 97, at 48. The Court's holding in Fresno v. Califor-
nia is not the definitive interpretation of the statute, however, because the state court of last
resort is the ultimate interpreter of statutes of that state. Hart, The Relations Between State &
Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 501-02 (state court free to disregard Supreme Court
precedent on state law question); L. TRIBE, supra note 42, § 5-20 at 301-02 & n.10. See also
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938) (Constitution preserves the indepen-
dence of state legislative and judicial branches). There has not been a state court interpreta-
tion of § 11460. See Robie & Kletzing, supra; at 433. The state attorney general opined that
the statute created an inchoate preference only to areas adjoining the watershed in which the
water originated. 25 OP. CAL. A-r'Y GEN. 8, 19-22 (1955); others have also urged that the
protected area must be limited to such areas. See Robie & Kletzing, supra, at 433.
Other states have enacted area of origin statutes. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-45-
18(b)(IV) (1974) (exportation of water not to impair present and prospective beneficial
water uses within the "natural" Colorado River basin); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82,
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The validity of such statutes should depend upon several factors. One
factor is the extensiveness of the area that is given preferential access to
local water supplies. If the protected area of origin is defined as an
entire state or the area in which water uses are restricted is exclusively
outside the regulating state, the statute facially discriminates against
interstate commerce and would be evaluated under the strict scrutiny
analysis.' 80 If the protected area is defined in a manner restricting
water availability for prospective uses both within and without the reg-
ulating state, there would be no facial discrimination against interstate
commerce. The statute would still be evaluated under strict scrutiny if
there was a discriminatory effect. 8' It could also be subject to chal-
lenge as an unreasonable burden upon commerce.' 82 The approach
used to determine whether a state regulation impermissibly burdens in-
terstate commerce is ostensibly a balancing test: the statute should be
upheld unless the burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the
local benefits, provided there is a legitimate local interest served by the
statute.
83
A second factor affecting the validity of area of origin statutes is
the nature of the local interest. The two local interests likely to be ad-
vanced by such statutes are the conservation of water resources and the
protection of potential development in the area of origin. The conser-
vation interest has been characterized as both "legitimate" and "highly
important." 8 4 The local interest in protecting potential development is
§ 1086.A(A)(4) (West Supp. 1984) (area of origin users have prior right for beneficial use;
only surplus water can be exported); Tax. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.102 (West 1972) (no
removal of surface water from the river basin of origin except on an interim basis if the
water will be required for reasonably forseeable local uses in the next 50 years).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 131-34, 173-76.
181. See supra note 172. A discriminatory effect is likely if the water uses outside the
area of origin were found to involve interstate commerce, especially if water uses within the
area of origin did not. It is unlikely that local water uses would not involve interstate com-
merce because most activities affect interstate commerce when examined in combination
with similar activities elsewhere. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942).
Although Wckardinvolved congressional regulation, the scope of the Commerce Clause is
the same whether Congress or the Court is acting. Hughes, 441 U.S. 322, 326 n.2 (1979). At
any rate, ground water itself is an item of commerce. Spor hase, 458 U.S. at 954. Surface
water should similarly be an item of commerce, for it is capable of being put to the same
uses as ground water.
182. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 959. This is true even where there is neither facial dis-
crimination nor a discriminatory effect.
183. See supra text accompanying note 116. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Cloverleaf Creamery,
449 U.S. 456 (1981).
184. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 954; see Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336-37 (state interest in conserv-
ing natural resourcesis similar to state interest in health & safety of citizens). After declar-
ing that the conservation purpose proffered by the state was highly important, the Court
proceeded with strict scrutiny analysis without further discussion of the state interest in-
volved therein. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 954-57. Had the Court not felt that the conservation
purpose was sufficiently important, there would have been no need to examine the statutory
unlikely to meet with similar judicial approval because statutes effect-
ing economic protectionism are viewed with great disfavor by the
Court. 8 5 Although the Court need not defer to the state's characteriza-
tion of the puTose of a challenged statute, 8 6 in practice the Court
often does so.'
Assuming the existence of a legitimate local purpose, but a dis-
criminatory effect, the Court would examine whether the area of origin
statute was closely tailored to achieve the local purpose. This examina-
tion entails a two part analysis: (1) whether the statute actually furthers
the local interest,"'8 and, (2) whether there exists a less discriminatory
alternative. 8 9 If no alternative source of water supply were available
to the area of origin, a statute that preserved water for local uses might
be considered sufficiently necessary under both prongs of the
analysis.
190
means chosen to effect the purpose. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525,
532-33, 545 (1949) (Court did not address the validity of the means because the protectionist
purpose was illegitimate). Cf. Cities Service Gas Co., 340 U.S. at 188 (conservation is not
only a strong state interest but also a strong national interest).
185. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (invalidating statute reserving
waste disposal sites for exclusive use by residents); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 336 U.S. 525
(1949) (invalidating statute providing for denial of license to import milk where new busi-
ness would compete with existing businesses); Baldwin, 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (invalidating
statute providing for minimum sale price for imported milk); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,
262 U.S. 553 (1923) (invalidating statute proscribing export of natural gas unless local users'
needs were satisfied). But see Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 143 (1970) (protec-
tion of local economic interests legitimate, but insufficient in this case to justify burden on
interstate commerce); Cities Service Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950) (upheld statute providing
for minimum wellhead prices on natural gas of which 90% was sold out of state); Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (upheld statute providing for minimum prices on raisin crop
where state had virtual monopoly on raisin production and most raisins entered interstate
commerce). The last two cases involved regulations that affected all sales of the restricted
resource, whether in-state or out-of-state. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 367; Cities Service, 340
U.S. at 187-88.
186. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336.
187. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 626.
188. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957.
189. See Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336; Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 354. This portion of the
dormant Commerce Clause analysis was never reached in Sporhase. 458 U.S. at 957 ("The
reciprocity requirement fails to clear this initial hurdle") (emphasis added).
190. If a "demonstrably arid state" were able to justify an embargo, see Supra text accom-
panying note 172, then a hydrological subdivision would seem to deserve a similar opportu-
nity. Some commentators believe that an area of origin statute drawn to prohibit the export
of water outside a suitable hydrological unit--such as a watershed or aquifer-would sur-
vive dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny as long as it was applied nondiscriminately to uses
both within and without the state. See White, supra note 5, at 405; Comment, City of Altus
v. Carr, 9 Aiuz. L. Rav. 334, 338 n.38 (1967).
Protection of uses within the watershed is a characteristic of the riparian system of
water law. WATER POLICIES, supra note 2, at 330. See, e.g., Dommick v. City of New
London, 157 Conn. 9, 245 A.2d 569 (1968) (surface water diversion out of watershed re-
quires compensation to users within the watershed). Similar protection for users on land
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A third factor is the method chosen to protect prospective uses in
the area of origin. The central inquiry is the extent that uses out of the
area of origin are permitted when there is no local need for some or all
of the water. A statute providing for full interim use by nonlocal
users 191 presumably would be viewed more favorably by the Court
than one effecting a total ban on out-of-area use. In the case of a total
ban, there is the alternative of permitting interim use, which has less
impact on interstate commerce. 192 The state could restrict the nonlocal
use to the same extent as an equivalent local use under the rationale of
evenhandedness.
93
A fourth factor affecting the validity of an area of origin statute
challenged under the Commerce Clause is whether Congress has con-
sented to this type of state legislation. If Congress gave its consent,
such a statute would be valid even though it substantially burdened or
discriminated against interstate commerce. 194  There are indications
that Congress has consented to area of origin statutes. First, section 8
of the Reclamation Act of 1902 provides that diversion of water for
reclamation purposes is subject to state water laws.195 A second indica-
tion is the area of origin protection in the Colorado River Basin Project
Act.' 96 Section 203 of that Act provides that uses within the area of
origin shall be adequately and equitably protected, and that such uses
"shall have priority of right in perpetuity to the use of the waters of that
overlying ground water sources is provided by certain riparian states that follow the Ameri-
can "reasonable use" rule of ground water law. See, e.g., Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d
859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971). Such protection, however, is contrary to the basic tenet of appro-
priation doctrine that water should be put to beneficial use regardless of the site of such use.
See WATER POLICIES, supra note 2, at 323.
191. This is the approach taken by most area of origin statutes. See supra note 179. It is
difficult to see why an interim nonlocal user-whose right to export water from the area of
origin was created subject to termination in favor of prospective local needs-should not be
estopped from challenging a subsequent exercise of that termination condition. Of course,
estoppel cannot be asserted against the United States unless there is "affirmative miscon-
duct" by government officials, INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 8 (1973); Montana v. Kennedy, 366
U.S. 308, 314-15 (1961), or if government acquiescence or consent "lead[s] to the fruition of
a number of expectancies embodied in the concept of 'property."' Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979). The latter exception appears to be applicable to the situa-
tion posed above. This is particularly likely if the federal use of water is by a federal recla-
mation project, for such water use is subject to state water law in the absence of clear
congressional directives to the contrary. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 672 n.25,
674, 679 (1978).
192. See supra text accompanying note 189
193. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 954. In the case of ground water this might be a restric-
tion designed to prevent or limit ground water mining. See supra notes 26, 128.
194. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
195. Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1976). See supra text accompanying
notes 146-49.
196. Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-537, § 102, 82 Stat. 885,
codified in 43 U.S.C. §§ 1501-56 (1976).
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river basin" whether they are existing or prospective uses. 197 Finally,
article X of the Yellowstone River Compact provides that all signatory
states must consent to diversion out of the river basin. 19 The latter two
indications of congressional consent may not provide much support for
state-enacted area of origin protections because they involve direct con-
gressional action in which all fifty states were able to participate. Re-
gardless of the deference to state water laws expressed in the
Reclamation Act, the Court probably would follow the analysis in
Sporhase and apply the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine unless the
nonlocal users challenging the area of origin statute obtained their
water from a federal reclamation project. 199
In summary, a statute providing protection for prospective water
uses in the area in which the water originates might survive dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny if the following conditions existed: 1) in-
terim, nonlocal water uses are permitted to the same extent as local
uses under state law; 2) rights to interim water use outside the area of
origin were expressly made subject to termination by prospective local
users at the time those rights were created; 3) interim uses are allowed
regardless of state boundaries; 4) the protected area closely corresponds
to actual hydrological conditions, Le. a watershed or ground water ba-
sin; and 5) the area of origin has no feasible alternative supply of water.
Generally, the best way for a state to protect its finite water re-
sources from depletion is to enact statutes that truly have conservation
as their primary purpose, that are narrowly drawn to accomplish that
purpose, and that avoid placing the burden of conservation solely on
those outside the state.2°° Such statutes should apply to both intrastate
and extrastate uses of water and should require that all water use be
beneficial and reasonable. 20 1 Furthermore, the allocation of both
ground water and surface waters should be made under a single system
in recognition of the fact that they are integrally related; conservation
197. 43 U.S.C. § 1513 (1976). This protection is for areas from which water might be
diverted into the Colorado River system. Id
198. Yellowstone River Compact Act of 1951, Pub. L. ch. 629, 65 Stat. 663, 669 (1952).
199. See supra text accompanying notes 157-61.
200. See Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337 (burden of conservation cannot be placed fully on
nonresidents).
201. See STATE WATER LAWS, supra note 12, at 10; WATER POLICIES, supra note 2, at
305; Ladd, supra note 5, at 311; McDaniel, supra note 5, at 545; Note, supra note 5, at 1276-
77. Present laws may require some modification to assure that a person conserving water
has some right to the water that would have been wasted but for the conservation. That
topic, however, is beyond the scope of this Note. The interested reader is directed to Dick-
enson, Installation of Water Saving Devices as a Means of Enlarging on Appropriation Right
to Use of Water, 2 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 272 (1969); Comment, Water Saved or Water
Lost: The Consequences of Individual Conservation Measures in the Appropriation States, 11
LAND & WATER L. REV. 435 (1976).
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of one cannot succeed without conservation of the other.20 2 A state
should also consider regulating the price of water to encourage conser-
vation.20 3 A state could take these steps without creating an unneces-
sary burden on interstate commerce: this approach is probably the
least discriminatory means of promoting the legitimate and important
state interest in the preservation of scarce water resources.
There are two alternatives other than direct regulation that a state
might use to protect water originating within its borders. One ap-
proach is to insist on compliance with statutes that require environmen-
tal impact studies.20 These statutes apply where a proposed water
diversion could significantly affect the environment.2"6 They probably
would not offer much long-term protection against the exportation of
water201 although they might delay full implementation of the exporta-
tion project.20 8
202. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
203. See WATER POLICIES, supra note 2, at 249, 259.
204. The preservation of scarce interstate water resources is also a national interest.
Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 954. The same is true of intrastate water resources, see supra notes 18-
20, 116.
One example of a regulatory scheme drawn to address the considerations expressed in
the text is the Owens Valley Groundwater Ordinance, the text of which appears in Rossman
& Steel, Forging the New Water Law: Public Regulation of "Proprietary" Groundwater
Rights, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 903, 951 (1982). The ordinance does not purport to fully regulate
surface water usage because of the fact that surface water diversions predate the regulation
by several decades and because of the specter of preemption by the statewide regulatory
scheme involving surface water. See id. at 915, 941. See also supra note 179.
205. See, e.g., County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles, 124 Cal. App. 3d 1, 177 Cal. Rptr.
479 (1981). The pertinent federal statute is the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
42 U.S.C. § 4321-78 (1976). This statute mandates the completion of an Environmental Im-
pact Statement for any major federal action significantly affecting the environment. Several
states have enacted similar statutes. See, e.g., Environmental Quality Act of 1970, CAL. PUB.
RES. CODE §§ 21000-176 (West Supp. 1984) (Environmental Impact Report required if pro-
ject that may significantly affect the environment requires approval of a public entity). Both
the federal and the California statutes merely require a negative declaration where signifi-
cant environmental effect is unlikely. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (by implication); 40 C.F.R.
§§ 1501.4, 1508.4, 1508.13 (1983); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080(c) (West 1977); CAL. AD-
MIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15070 (1984).
206. See supra note 205.
207. The federal statute does not mandate the selection of the alternative with the least
environmentally harmful effects. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444
U.S. 223, 228 (1980) (per curiam). State statutes often do not provide for overturning an
agency approval of a project that may cause environmental harm where substantial evidence
supports the decision. See, e.g., Laurel Hills Homeowners Ass'n v. City Council, 83 Cal.
App. 3d 515, 521, 525, 174 Cal. Rptr. 842, 846, 848 (1978) (California statute interpreted).
Some statutes, however, have been held to provide more protection. See, e.g., Minnesota ex.
relPowderly v. Erickson, 285 N.W.2d 84, 89 (Minn. 1979) (paramount consideration given
to environment under Minnesota statute).
208. For example, a preliminary injunction prohibiting the City of Los Angeles from
increasing its ground water extraction in the Owens Valley has been in effect since 1972. See
Rossman & Steel, supra note 204, at 916-25. The permissible rate of ground water extrac-
A more practical approach would be to institute a tax on the use of
water. State taxation of interstate commerce is evaluated under a dif-
ferent standard than state regulation of such commerce. 2 9 A severance
tax at the rate of thirty percent of the contract price of coal has been
upheld by the Court;210 a tax levied upon water use at such a rate
probably would prevent water export. Such a tax, however, probably
would be of only limited assistance in preventing appreciable water ex-
port. In order to be constitutionally permissible, a tax on the extraction
or use of water must be applied equally to all those extracting or using
the water whether they are within or outside the state.2"' Furthermore,
when the Court upheld the thirty percent severance tax, it relied upon
the fact that the taxed activity, coal mining, would "deplet[e] the re-
source base and wealth of the State, thereby diminishing a future
source of taxes and economic activity."2 2 This rationale apparently
would not apply to water resources that would be replenished by rain-
fall within a reasonable time but would seem to apply to the mining of
ground water from a basin having negligible recharge.21 3 Assuming
that such a severance tax was levied upon both nonresident and resi-
dent users or extractors of ground water, and that the other require-
ments of valid state taxes upon interstate commerce are met,214 such a
tion, however, was based upon a formula that did not consider local environmental effects.
Id. at 925.
209. L. TRIBE, supra note 42, § 6-14, at 344. The current test employed by the Court in
evaluating state taxation of interstate commerce was first articulated in Complete Auto
Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). This test has the following four elements: 1) the
taxed activity must have a substantial nexus with the taxing states; 2) the tax must be fairly
apportioned among all states with such a nexus; 3) the tax must not discriminate against
interstate commerce; and 4) the tax must be fairly related to the services provided by the
taxing state. Id at 279; see Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 614, 617-26
(1981). General revenue taxes are viewed with considerable deference by the Court. Com-
monwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 622. This deference apparently reflects a belief that taxation
is necessary to enable state governments to continue to provide essential governmental serv-
ices. See id at 622-26. Cf. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (Fair Labor
Standard Act amendments could not be applied to state governments because of interference
with "traditional governmental functions").
210. See Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 629.
211. See supra note 209. The tax could not be facially discriminatory; however, as long
as the rate is equal, the overall burden could fall more heavily on out-of-state users than on
in-state users. In Commonwealth Edison as much as 90% of the burden imposed by the state
was borne by out-of-state coal users. 453 U.S. at 639 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Nonethe-
less, the tax was upheld.
212. 453 U.S. at 624. See generally McGrath & Hellerstein, Reflections on Common-
wealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 43 MoNT. L. REv. 165 (1982).
213. It is logically difficult to justify a distinction between nonrenewable water resources
and other nonrenewable natural resources. Cf. supra note 26 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 209. For example, the rate for such a tax might have to be propor-
tional to the revenue raised from the taxed activity rather than a flat-rate tax. See Case
Note, Commerce Clause Standardsfor State Taxation of Aineral Severance: Commonwealth
Edison v. State of Montana., 17 LAND & WATER L. RaV. 167, 186 (1982).
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tax should be valid. A less burdensome tax that was applied evenhand-
edly probably could be levied against renewable water resources.
B. The Proper Method of Managing Interstate Ground Water Aquifers
The Sporhase decision demonstrates the need for ground water
management on a scale far beyond that which an individual state can
constitutionally provide.2 15 Although it was asserted in Sporhase that
there already is a de facto apportionment of the water of the Ogallala
aquifer,216 the fact remains that the aquifer continues to be depleted
217
and that further agreement among the overlying states is needed to pre-
vent a race to the bottom. Water resource planning should take into
account all sources of water in an integrated way.
218
One method of allocating interstate water is the equitable appor-
tionment doctrine, which was developed by the Supreme Court to help
solve interstate water disputes that have given rise to litigation involv-
ing more than one state.219 The principle is based on the equality of
right among the states.22' The Court relies on the following factors to
apportion the water among the states:
[p]hysical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of water
in the several sections of the river, the character and rate of re-
turn flows, the extent of established uses, the availability of stor-
age water, the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream
areas, [and] the damage to upstream areas as compared to the
benefits to downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the
former.221
215. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 954. See also WATER POLICIES, supra note 2, at 232.
216. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 74, at 10. The State of Colorado's support for the
statute, supra note 71, as well as that State's denial of appellants' application to withdraw
ground water from Colorado in order to prevent "depletion wars," supra note 25, are some
indication that there was such a de facto apportionment. But cf. infra notes 225-28.
217. See supra note 26.
218. See supra note 151. Cf. supra note 82.
219. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982). These cases are in the original juris-
diction of the Supreme Court Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 98 (1907). The Court justi-
fied its exercise of jurisdiction as follows: "Surely here is a dispute of a justifiable nature
... . If the two States were absolutely independent nations it would be settled by treaty or
by force. Neither of these ways being practicable it must be settled by decision of this
Court." Id. at 98. For an account of many of the equitable apportionment decisions of the
Supreme Court, see Witmer, Documents on the Use and Control of the Waters of Interstate
and International Streams, H.R. Doc. No. 319, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
220. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 100.
221. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945). Although not clearly expressed in
the language quoted in the text, the Court also considers conservation; the equitable appor-
tionment analysis does not protect existing uses of water that are wasteful or inefficient. See
Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. at 185. The doctrine has been used to "impose on states
an affirmative duty to take reasonable steps to conserve. . . ." Id. Thus, the Court looked
favorably upon allowing Colorado to use some of the flow of the Vermejo River--even
Understandably, the Court is reluctant to go through this complex
analysis222 and has suggested that states settle such disputes among
themselves by interstate compact.223 Consistent with this view, the
Court has restricted its consideration to cases in which a threatened
harm of serious magnitude is established by clear and convincing evi-
dence."24 This further reduces the likelihood that Supreme Court re-
view will be an effective means of achieving interstate ground water
management.
Logically, the equitable apportionment doctrine should apply to
ground water as well as the flow of surface water in streams; 25 how-
ever, there are two serious practical difficulties. First, the cost of ob-
taining the necessary hydrologic evidence is excessive.2 6 Second, the
hydrology of ground water is considerably more complex than that of
surface water flows; the straight forward monitoring sufficient to deter-mine surface water flows is inadequate to quantify ground water.227
The necessary analysis may be beyond the capabilities of the Court.
228
Both the Court and commentators are apparently unanimous in their
preference for the use of interstate compacts to allocate interstate
waters.229
Interstate compacts are implicitly authorized by the Con-
stitution;2 30 most compacts require and receive congressional ap-
though the river was already fully appropriated in New Mexico-because there were indica-
tions that the New Mexico uses were inefficient. 459 U.S. at 185-88.
222. The Court has only issued three decrees allocating water between states. See Ladd,
supra note 5, at 270.
223. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 392 (1943). Cf. supra note 219 (equitable appor-
tionment doctrine a substitute for a treaty between states).
224. New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921).
225. Fischer, Management of Interstate Ground Water, 7 NAT. RESOURCE LAW. 521, 544
(1974). To date the equitable apportionment doctrine has not been applied to ground water.
See id. at 541. There is some indication that the Court might limit the application of the
doctrine to the waters of interstate streams. See Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. at 177.
226. Comment, Allocating .Buried Treasure: FederalLitigation Involving Interstate Ground
Water, I 1 LAND & WATER L. REV. 103, 123-24 (1976). Even the tendency of the Court to
apportion costs among the parties in equitable apportionment cases may not bring this liti-
gation within reach of state litigants. Id
227. Id at 121, 124-25; WATER POLICIES, supra note 2, at 244.
228. See Comment, supra note 226, at 125, and authorities cited therein.
229. See Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 392 (1943); WATER POLICIES, supra note 2, at
244-45; Fischer, supra note 225, at 546; Ladd, supra note 5, at 274; Comment, supra note 226,
at 130.
230. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 provides: "No State shall, without the Consent of
Congress. . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State .... "
A compact is essentially a treaty between two quasi-sovereign states that has been au-
thorized by Congress. Ladd, supra note 5, at 275 and n.38; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts,
37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 725 (1838) (once Congress consents, compact has "same effect as a
treaty between sovereign powers"). Either because it is a treaty or because it is federal law, a
compact prevails over ordinary state law. Id at 276. A compact has even overriden a provi-
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proval.23' Interstate compacts are being used increasingly as a means of
dealing with regional problems on a regional basis.232 Several methods
of allocating interstate waters have been used in such compacts, includ-
ing the following: apportionment between states of specific amounts of
water and of the risk of reduced flow; 233 apportionment of a percentage
of available water to individual states; 234 and provision for a flexible
method that adjusts to differing water flows and allows rotation of
water uses among the states involved.235 All of the above methods ap-
pear amenable to use in an interstate compact apportioning the waters
of the Ogallala aquifer.
sion of a state constitution: the United States Supreme Court interpreted a state constitution
differently than had the state supreme court in order to avoid a conflict between the compact
and the state constitution. Dyer v. Simms, 341 U.S. 22 (1951); see Fischer, supra note 225, at
535 (the Court should have held directly that the compact overrode the state constitution);
Ladd, supra note 5, at 276.
231. Engdahl, Characterization of Interstate Arrangements: When is a Compact not a
Compact, 64 MICH. L. Rav. 63, 103. Although the constitutional language appears to allow
states to enter compacts only with the consent of Congress, see supra note 230, it has long
been held that the consent of Congress is not necessary to all interstate compacts. See Vir-
ginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519-20 (1893); L. TRIBE, supra note 42, § 6-31, at 401-02.
The standard employed to determine if congressional consent is required is whether the
compact would increase the political power of the compacting states, and thus encroach
upon the full and free exercise of federal power. Id; Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. at 520.
232. Muys, Interstate Compacts and Regional Water Resources Planning and Manage-
ment, 6 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 153 (1973). Muys lists several interstate compacts that allo-
cate water between states. Id. at 187. For the text of those interstate compacts involving
water allocation that had been executed by 1968, Witmer, supra note 219.
233. See, e.g., Colorado River Basin Compact of 1922, art. III, §§ (a), (b), (d), approvedin
Boulder Canyon Project Act, Dec. 21, 1949, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057, 1064, cod#Fed in 43 U.S.C.
§ 6171 (a) (1976). The text of the Compact appears in Witmer, supra note 219, at 54. Water
was apportioned in the amounts of 7.5 million acre feet per year to the Upper Basin states
(Colorado, New Mexico, Wyoming and part of Arizona) and to the Lower Basin states (Cal-
ifornia, Nevada and the rest of Arizona).
234. See, e.g., Upper Colorado River Basin Compact of 1948, Act of Apr. 6, 1949, ch. 48,
63 Stat. 31, 32-33. The apportionment was as follows: Colorado-51.75 %; New Mexico-
11.25 %; Utah-23.00 %; Wyoming-14.00 % of the water remaining after Arizona received
50,000 acre feet per year, subject to the Colorado River Compact.
235. See, e.g., La Plata River Compact of 1922, Act of Jan. 29, 1925, ch. 110, art. II, §§ 2-
3, 43 Stat. 796, 797 (between Colorado and New Mexico). The apportionment took the
following three forms: (1) when the mean daily flow exceeded 100 cubic feet per second,
each state had an unrestricted right to use all water within its boundaries; (2) when the mean
flow was less, half of the flow had to be delivered to the downstream state; and (3) when the
flow was so low that in the opinion of the respective state engineers, the greatest beneficial
use would result from rotating the water use between the two states, they had discretion to
rotate water uses. The latter apportionment method was challenged as unconstitutional in
Hinderlider ',. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, reh'g denied. 305 U.S.
668 (1938). The Court held that the La Plata Company's Colorado water right (established
in 1898) consisted solely of Colorado's share of the water. Therefore, the 1922 Compact did
not effect a taking of a vested right for which compensation was required. 304 U.S. at 108.
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There are several advantages to allocating water by interstate com-
pact. First, the ultimate allocation is made by the states themselves,
rather than imposed upon them by the federal government. Second, a
framework is established for dealing with the complexities involved in
such an allocation, thus providing a level of certainty.236 Third, a com-
pact provides the flexibility needed to adjust to future changes in condi-
tions.23 And fourth, compacts can provide for administration by
experts in water management. 38
Despite these advantages, some commentators are pessimistic
about the likelihood of interstate compacts being formed to allocate
ground water.239 The difficulty and cost of obtaining the necessary hy-
drological data may prove to be significant obstacles to the formation
of such compacts.' 4 In the case of the Ogallala aquifer, these obstacles
must be weighed against the hardships that would ensue if the present
overdraft is not reduced or eliminated;24' at stake is twenty percent of
America's key agricultural products and twenty-five percent of the na-
tion's agricultural exports.242
One recent development that increases the chances for successful
formation of interstate ground water allocation compacts is the recog-
nition that Congress has the power to legislate on the subject.243 In a
236. Ladd, supra note 5, at 274.
237. Id at 276. See Fischer, supra note 225, at 532.
238. Ladd, supra note 5, at 276.
239. See Id. at 287-88; Fischer, supra note 225, at 546.
240. See supra notes 226-27.
241. See supra note 26.
242. See supra note 19.
243. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 954. If the overlying states do not reach an agreement
about the allocation of interstate ground water, it is possible that Congress will allocate the
water in a way not to the liking of these states. In the case of the Ogallala aquifer, however,
Congress has indicated its willingness to address the problem of ground water depletion by
importing water into the Great Plains region. See supra note 82; see also 16 U.S.C. § 590y
(1976) (Secretary of Interior may construct water conservation and utilization projects in the
Great Plains region). If the states overlying the Ogallala aquifer anticipate that Congress
will act to augment the water supply available in the region, they may be less likely to
negotiate a compact to allocate the ground water in the aquifer.
In the Colorado River Basin Project Act, Congress acted to regulate ground water in
two ways: (I) by requiring that Arizona control the expansion of irrigation in areas to be
served by the Central Arizona Project in a way satisfactory to the Secretary of the Interior,
and (2) by prohibiting pumping of ground water in areas to be served by the Central Ari-
zona Project, unless the Secretary and the water contractor agree that there is a ground water
surplus. 43 U.S.C. § 1524(c) (1976). The former provision provided much of the impetus
for Arizona to leave the dwindling ranks of Western states that do not manage their ground
water resources. See Higdon & Thompson, The 1980 Groundwater Management Code, 1980
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 621, 621-28 & n.3. The statute that was enacted in response to Congress'
action, ARIZ. Rav. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-401 to -637 (West Supp. 1982), has been upheld
against constitutional challenges in both state and federal court. See Town of Chino Valley
v. City of Prescott, 131 Ariz. 78, 638 P.2d 1324 (1981); Cherry v. Steiner, 543 F. Supp. 1270
(D. Ariz. 1982).
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1964 decision, the Supreme Court first made it clear that Congress has
this power. 2" The Court, however, did not identify the source of Con-
gress' power to regulate water.245 One commentator has reasoned the
source is Congress' power to regulate navigable waters under the Com-
merce Clause.246 Today this analysis is superfluous, for Congress can
regulate water as it is an item of commerce.
247
There have been instances of congressional allocation of interstate
water.248 The prime examples are the Acts establishing projects on the
Colorado River, which allocate water between the States of Arizona,
California and Nevada,249 incorporating the allocation of water made
244. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (construing the Boulder Canyon Project
Act, cod#Fedin 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1976)).
245. See Corker, Transbasin Diversions, supra note 5, at 143. Cf. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at
961 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
246. Ladd, supra note 5, at 285. If this were the sole source of congressional power to
regulate water, ground water would be beyond the reach of Congress. As Professor Corker
put it, the only navigable water under the ground is the River Styx, which is not navigable
by mortals. See Corker, Transbasin Diversions, supra note 5, at 143.
247. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 953-54. One commentator felt that Congress is reluctant to
regulate ground water quantity. Fischer, supra note 225, at 530. Cf. Safe Drinking Water
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-523, §§ 1421-25, 88 Stat. 1661, 1674, codified as amended in 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300h to 300h-3 (1982) (regulating the quality of ground water used for drinking). Con-
gressional reluctance to regulate the quantity of ground water probably derives from the
long-standing federal deference to state water law, see, e.g., California v. United States, 438
U.S. 645, 653; California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 395 U.S. 142
(1935) (construing the Desert Lands Act of 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377), which has created the
"legal expectation" that each state may regulate the use of water within its borders.
Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 956, 102 S.Ct. at 3463. Further reasons for the federal reluctance to
interfere with state regulation of water appear supra in the text accompanying notes 117-18,
120-22.
248. Many Acts recognize prior rights established under state law or interstate compact.
See 43 U.S.C. § 600b (1976) (Canadian River Project, Texas) (protecting upstream uses in
New Mexico); 43 U.S.C. §§ 620a, 620b (1976) (Colorado River Storage Project/San Juan-
Chama Project) (to be operated in compliance with Colorado River compacts); Act of Aug.
16, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-590, § 5 (a), 76 Stat. 392 (Fryingpan-Arkansas Project) (water di-
verted from Colorado River basin to Arkansas River basin included in Colorado's entitle-
ment under Colorado River compacts); Act of June 13, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-483, §§ 8 (a)-
(b), 76 Stat. 96, 98 (San Juan-Chama Reclamation Project) (specifying amount of water to
be diverted from Colorado into New Mexico; protecting Colorado's present and future uses
that are part of the Colorado River and Rio Grande River compacts). Other Acts have
protected future rights or given priority in project waters to one state. Id (protects future
rights); Act of Aug. 1, 1956, ch. 809, 70 Stat. 775, 776 (Washoe Reclamation Project, Califor-
nia & Nevada) (water users in Alpine County, California have first priority to contract for
project water); cf. Act of Sept. 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-565, § 2, 78 Stat. 848 (Dixie Project,
Utah) (measures must be taken in operation of project to provide water of sufficient quality
for downstream users in other states). Another approach is to delay implementation of a
project until the appropriate agencies agree on a suitable allocation. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C.
§ 1962d-1 l(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981) (Potomac River Water Diversion Structure).
249. See Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057 (codFedin 43 U.S.C.
§ 617 (1976)); Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-537, 82 Stat. 885
(codfed in 43 U.S.C. §§ 1501-56 (1976)).
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in the Colorado River Compact.25 0 The Boulder Canyon Project Act25 '
gave the Secretary of the Interior authority to allocate the water of the
Colorado River among the three states, 252 and the Supreme Court en-
tered a decree upholding the Secretary's allocation.253 In the Colorado
River Basin Project Act,254 Congress established the order of priority
among these states in times of shortage.25 5 Congress could make a sim-
ilar allocation of the ground water of the Ogallala aquifer.
The question remains whether Congress should exercise that
power. It may be beyond the power of the states that overlie a ground
water source to shape the regulation into a form they feel is most bene-
ficial to their interests. Any congressional regulation must take into
account the vast differences between the various regions. 256 The Water
Resources Development Act is a laudable example of Congress adopt-
ing a regional approach.257 This Act has set the stage for potential
federal regulation of the water resources in the lands overlying the
Ogallala aquifer. If the overlying states cannot successfully negotiate a
water allocation compact among themselves, Congress must act to reg-
ulate water resources in this important region before the aquifer is dan-
gerously depleted. If the federal government takes a more active role
in water allocation, it should do so consistently with the tradition of
deferring to the state laws. 5" Respect for these laws is necessary to
preserve the basic state systems of water allocation and water adjudica-
tion, and the vested water rights of private citizens.
Conclusion
In Sporhase, the United States Supreme Court recognized that
proper regulation of water use is essential, especially in the West. The
Court noted that Congress has the power to regulate water use in the
national interest if state regulation proves unsatisfactory. This specter
of federal control of state water resources should motivate states to
amend their statutes that are intended to prevent the depletion of their
250. See supra note 233.
251. See supra note 249.
252. Arizona v. California, 378 U.S. 546, 580, 590 (1963) (decision).
253. Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964) (decree). Each state was given an annual
allocation; Arizona was allocated 2.8 million acre feet, California 4.4 million acre feet, and
Nevada 300,000 acre feet. Id. at 342.
254. See supra note 249.
255. The requirements of the Mexican Treaty were given first priority. 43 U.S.C. § 1512
(1976). Holders of present perfected rights and users pursuant to existing contracts were
given priority over users of water of the Central Arizona Project. 43 U.S.C. § 1521(b)
(1976).
256. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 952 n.13. (citing California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645,
648 (1978)).
257. See supra note 82.
258. See sufpra note 145.
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finite water resources. These statutes should be carefully redrawn to
further efficient water use and conservation without unduly burdening
nonresidents; there should be coordinated regulation of ground water
and surface water. States also should consider seriously the use of in-
terstate compacts to provide regional solutions for water management
problems that extend beyond the borders of an individual state. Com-
pacts should provide for water conservation and integrated manage-
ment of all water supplies. If states properly regulate the nation's water
resources, Congress will not be compelled to alter its long standing tra-
dition of deference to state water resource management.
In the words of one state supreme court, "[iln the arid and semi-
arid regions of the west it is imperative that all water be utilized benefi-
cially and without waste." '259 To assure that this occurs, we must de-
velop methods of regulating water use on a regional basis, taking into
account differing local conditions. We must update some of our anach-
ronistic legal doctrines that only hinder proper water utilization.
259. Williams v. City of Wichita, 190 Kan. 317, 338, 374 P.2d 578, 593 (1962) (quoting
Baumann v. Shirraha, 145 F. Supp. 617, 625 (D. Kan. 1956)).
